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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON SEARCH
Timothy Hursey
Francis DiTraglia
This dissertation consists of three chapters that examine search frictions within the macroe-
conomy. In the first chapter, I construct a model of simultaneous search to propose a novel
contributor to the twin effects of labor force participation decline and rising wage inequality.
An algorithm for solving the pairwise-stable matching in a macro environment is provided
and incorporated into a dynamic, general equilibrium model. Falling search costs will gen-
erate falling labor force participation—as the lowest ranked workers are crowded out of the
market—and rising wage inequality—as the competition for desired skills increases. An
empirical tests corroborates the effects of cheap search on falling participation.
Chapter 2 assesses the contribution of aggregate vs. sectoral shocks to output volatil-
ity by building a real business cycle model calibrated to match realistic structure in the
market for all three major inputs to production—material inputs, capital goods and labor.
While the former two inputs are standard, this paper innovates on previous methods by
first expounding the structure of sectoral labor reallocation and then calibrating a model to
match its features. A common-factor estimation procedure attributes approximately half
of aggregate output volatility to sectoral shocks.
In Chapter 3, I explore the implications of lower search costs for product markets
by building a micro-founded model of shopping within an industry that features realistic
product search frictions. I show via a precise characterization that either increasing or
decreasing prices in response to cheaper search can be consistent with competitive equi-
librium, depending on the distribution of consumer tastes. This distribution-dependence
further dictates whether firms and varieties enter or exit the marketplace.
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Chapter 1
Wage Inequality and Labor Force
Participation in a
Simultaneous Random Search
Environment
1.1 Introduction
An increasing proportion of job search and hiring now occurs online. According to the survey
SilkRoad (2017), in 2017 over 50% of interviews are now sourced through online contacts.
In this same survey, the conversion rates of external application to interview and external
interview to hire are 33:1 and 3:1 respectively, combining to suggest that every vacancy
that is filled through online sources will require on average ∼ 99 applications. Similarly,
Marinescu and Wolthoff (2015) find using data from CareerBuilder.com that there were
59 applications per vacancy on that website. Compare this number to that reported in
Faberman and Menzio (2018) from the 1982 Employment Opportunity Pilot Project who
found an application per week per vacancy statistic of 22.3 for those vacancies filled within
1
one week (and notably fewer applications for all other openings.)
Corresponding with the rise in online job search has been a marked decrease in labor
force participation. As seen in 1.1, from its peak above 67% in 2000, participation has fallen
to under 63% in 2018.
Figure 1.1: Labor Force Participation
Yet this transition in labor force participation has not occurred equally for all groups.
According to Frazis (2017), the two single biggest predictors of labor force exit over the
period 2005-2015 were education and age of the worker–with younger, less-educated workers
exiting the labor force in much higher quantities.
As I will suggest later in the paper, labor force exit by predominantly younger and
lower skilled workers can be explained by a permanent “crowding out” effect brought on by
a rise in search efficiency. In a low information environment–where firms come into contact
with few workers–the lowest skilled in any distribution have a chance of “getting lucky”,
and being the best candidate around for the job. In the alternative–when firms sample a
large amount of potential workers–it is extremely unlikely that this same worker will prove
to be the best candidate for any job. Hence, their motivation to search will dry up and they
will exit the labor market. In a sense, workers of low skill benefit from search frictions, in
that they can be in the right place at the right time with a poorly informed firm that might
otherwise have matched with a better worker.
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This notion of “crowding out” is an old concept in the job search literature, though
usually cast in the context of movements over the business cycle. As labor conditions
worsen, firms can increase their hiring standards due to an increased pool of workers. To
my knowledge, this is the first paper that suggests this effect being generated by long-run
changes in search technology as opposed to productivity movements over the business cycle.
Concomitant with a fall in labor force participation has been an increase in wage
inequality. Pew Research (2018) documents that real wage increases since 2000 for the
lowest and highest decile of earners have been 3% and 15.7% respectively. The current
paper suggests a novel contributor to this rising wage inequality: as worker-firm contacts
increase–that is, as search frictions decline–competition for workers will increase and the
incentives to post high wages will increase disproportionately for already high-paying firms.
In the wage-posting environment I will build, posting a higher wage gives a notion of
preference to a firm in their worker choice process. When firms are more informed about the
existence of good workers they can choose more discriminately, and the value of this choice
preference increases along with the incentive to raise wages. The nature of this incentive
is predominately a competitive one–deviations yield preference at the cost of others–and
so higher-ranked firms will be disproportionately affected, as they face more competition
“from below” than lower-ranked firms. Higher-ranked firms will be induced to raise their
wages, and higher-ranked workers will more efficiently match with them.
The model used to demonstrate the twin effects of crowding out and wage inequality
will feature simultaneous random search. Workers will be allowed to sample firms ran-
domly at will; but, they will face a cost to do so. Time will be discrete, and the competition
amongst firms and workers in the matching space will be made explicit–firms will be con-
tacted by multiple workers and will choose the best candidate willing to work for them, given
that worker’s other contacts–i.e. a pairwise-stable matching. The pairwise stable matching
will occur in the context of (and be enabled by) wage posting with full commitment.
I will demonstrate, under mild assumptions, that the solution of the pairwise-stable
3
matching problem is tractable and it is governed by the solution of a system of two first-
order partial differential equations. In equilibrium, the solution of this system pins down
the expectations of workers and firms about their prospects of participating in the matching
market. I will approximate the solution to this system via pseudospectral element methods
with an endogenous division of the subdomain. In a technical sense, this paper will be of
interest to those who wish to solve such problems–a common occurrence when distributions
must be solved numerically within a model with actionable regions. The pseudospectral
methods must be implemented on subdivisions of the matching region because the model will
feature nondifferentiabilities and occasionally discontinuities–a fact that I will document.
After the model exposition, I will provide evidence of a link between labor force
participation and cheap search in the microdata of the Consumer Population Survey from
the BEA. Within an econometric specification, cheap search will be identified through the
Computer and Internet Use Supplement to the CPS survey, which asks users about internet
job search. A logistic regression specification will demonstrate a strong statistical link
between the presence of internet search and labor force exit by specifically younger and
uneducated workers—which represent two proxies for worker rank.
This paper joins a large and growing literature on matching environments with ran-
dom search frictions. Most of this literature focuses on sequential search (see: Shimer and
Smith (2000) for a pioneering example and Chade et al. (2017) for a thorough review.) I
have chosen to model simultaneous search here for a few reasons.
The first is that it more accurately captures the decision problem faced by firms. Gen-
erally firms receive a slew of applications, they sort through them and make offers in order
of their preferred candidates. This logic is more closely mimicked in a simultaneous search
environment and so allocations are likely to be better represented that way. Obversely, in a
sequential search model, a firm is merely looking for the first acceptable candidate to arrive,
and this acceptability is determined by a somewhat nebulous concept of “discounting”. It
is unclear, therefore, that the hiring decision of firms in a sequential model would match
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up–especially as the rate of contacts increases to many per day–to the intuitive picture of
a firm sorting through applications.
The second is that search competition in a discrete time setting is more amendable to
calibration and estimation. Data are received in discrete form; and indeed, continuous time
models are discretized vis-a-vis time in order to be fit to the data. Simultaneous search
therefore provides a ready form to be fit to data, as well as to serve as a check on the
prescriptions of the numerous models discretized from continuous time.
Another major contrast between this paper and the broader literature is the use of
wage-posting. A majority of models of search and matching rely on a bargaining game to
solve the bilateral monopoly problem of a matched firm and worker. Bargaining serves to
lend a great deal of tractability to what are otherwise complicated models. The decision
to use wage posting in this paper was made for two reasons. First, wage-posting generally
characterizes the behavior of firms looking to hire for low-skilled positions in the US labor
market. Therefore, wage-posting is a more natural choice when modeling the behavior of
lower-ranked workers. Additionally, wage-posting serves as a way to clear the matching
market in a simultaneous search and matching setting.
Several related papers to the current one are as follows. Uren and Virag (2011) build a
wage posting model in a search environment in continuous time. Their goal is to demonstrate
how changes in the production function–notably via skill-biased technological change–can
induce rising wage inequality. The current paper focuses instead on how the changing search
technology can generate effects on labor force participation and wage inequality.
There is also an emerging literature on the increasing efficiency of search or, equiv-
alently, in falling search frictions. Martellini and Menzio (2018) find evidence that search
frictions have declined considerably in recent years, and provide a theoretical rationalization
of how stationarity of key labor statistics can be preserved in spite of falling search costs. In
another vein, Hursey (2018) shows that in a product search environment, increasing search
efficiency can have positive or negative effects on both prices and market entry depending on
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the shape of idiosyncratic tastes. The current paper will employ a similar mechanism to the
case in Hursey (2018) where idiosyncratic tastes are small in magnitude: the competitive
effects of search will dominate and force the lowest performers out of a market.
The remaining paper will be organized into seven sections. Section 2 will present
the model environment, followed by the pairwise stable matching algorithm in Section 3.
Section 4 will embed the matching space into a general equilibrium framework, while Section
5 will provide details on the computation of the model via pseudospectral methods. Section
6 will show numerical results and Section 7 will include empirical ones. Section 8 concludes.
1.2 Model Environment
The model is set in discrete time with infinite periods denoted by t ∈ {0, 1, ...}. There
are two types of agents: workers, who are endowed with an indivisible unit of labor and
an idiosyncratic skill level a; and firms, to whom the workers’ labor can be sold and who
own their own technology characterized by the function y : A ×X → R which maps their
efficiency level x and the ability of their worker a into an output quantity y.
The workers constitute a positive measure of agents, normalized to 1. Of those, e are
matched with the same number of firms at any given time while 1−e are unmatched. There
is a positive measure V of unmatched firms/vacancies which is composed of a measure of
different efficiency firms such that
∫
X v(t)dt = V . Therefore, the distribution of efficiencies
of actively searching firms can be given as F (x) =
∫ x
¯
x v(t)dt
V .
The distribution of the abilities of workers in the population as a whole is described
by the CDF Ω : A→ [0, 1] which gives the probability Ω(a) that a randomly drawn worker
from the overall population will exhibit less ability than a. The efficiencies of firms are also
described by a CDF Λ : X → [0, 1]. This CDF describes the distribution of efficiencies of
putative firms; that is, those firms who could potentially enter the matching market should
they choose. The measure of new vacancies introduced each period which draw from these
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efficiencies is given by v¯.
Each firm and worker can be of two types: matched; or unmatched. At the beginning
of the period production occurs and matched worker-firm pairs produce using their tech-
nology while unmatched workers engage in home production that yields a payoff b ∈ R+.
Matched workers are paid a contracted wage w that is unchanged over the life of the match.
Unmatched firms produce nothing.
After production, unemployed workers can engage in costly search in order to match
with an unmatched firm and begin employment. There is no search on the job but it would
be an interesting direction for future research. Workers own a search technology z : R+ →
R+ that allows them to convert costly effort into an expected number of connections with
unmatched firms. The mechanism by which connections are converted into consummated
matches will be described later in the section on the matching algorithm.
The unmatched firms over which the unemployed will search are operating a vacancy
with which they have been endowed. At the end of the period, unmatched firms’ vacancies
have a probability δf of exploding, while a consummated match has a probability δ of doing
so. As separation occurs after search, separated workers do not engage in it in the period
they lose their job.
1.2.1 The Search Process
As stated in the previous section, workers can exert effort to match with z number of
expected vacancies. This subsection will describe the manner in which those connections
are apportioned amongst firms. This process will take the form of growing a bipartite graph
between the measures of firms and workers within the model.
The very first action in the search phase of the model is wage posting. Firms post
a wage w ∈ R to which they are committed during the period–meaning it is unchangeable
throughout the process of search and matching and must be paid over the life of any
consummated match. The distribution of these wages is given by the CDF Fw(w) which is
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both endogenous and of common knowledge. Upon meeting a firm, an unemployed worker
observes its posted wage.
Let zt(a) represent the expected number of connections obtained by the worker of
ability a. The actual number of connections of this worker is a random variable described
by the discrete distribution
Θ0(a) : Z× R+ → [0, 1]
. For the remainder of this paper I will assume than this distribution is a Poisson distribution
parameterized by rate zt(a). A Poisson distribution will deliver more tractable quantities
for the matching process; though other distributions may be used.
Let the measure of unemployed workers of ability a at the beginning of a period be
given by ut(a). Then the total measure of connections generated by the unemployed at the
beginning of the period is given by the quantity:
Z ≡
∫
s∈A
z(s)u0(s)ds
. These connections need to be distributed over the total measure of vacancies V .
The allocation of connections is at its core an example of generating a bipartite graph
between a positive measure Ut of unemployed and Vt of vacancies. Let Σ = (U, V, ε) describe
this graph with U , V the vertices and ε representing the set of edges between them. For this
graph to be consistent, a rule for distributing connections over U ×V needs to be proposed
such that the total number of connections equals Zt and the number of connections possessed
by both sides of the graph clear:
Zt = Vt
∫
s∈W
r(s)dF (s)
where r(w) describes average number of connections received by firms posting wage w.
For the remainder of the paper I will assume that the rule describing the edge gen-
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eration of the graph is the following one. It features independent allocation over vacancies
and workers, i.e. the probability that a connection belonging to a worker of ability a also
belongs to a firm of wage w does not depend on a or w. Further, firms receive a random
allocation of connections within wage levels that is itself described by a Poisson distribution.
That is, all firms receive a random allocation of connections given by a draw from Poisson
distribution with rate r(w) = r ∀w. To sum up, the edge clearing of the bipartite graph
is described by the equation:
Zt ≡
∫
s∈A
z(s)u0(s)ds = Vt
∫
s∈W
r(s)dF (s) = rVt
The method of graph generation given above which gives no preferential attachment
based on agent type is in some sense the most random–or undirected–possible. The wages
and abilities of workers give no guidance to which connection are formed between which
agents. While this assumption might not be entirely realistic, I consider it the ideal starting
point for an analysis of random, simultaneous search. Modifications which give preferential
attachment based on wage or ability–rendering search somewhat directed–is both beyond
the scope of this paper and a very interesting direction for future research.
1.3 The Matching Algorithm
The purpose of this section is to describe the algorithm used to generate a pairwise stable
matching between unemployed workers and vacancies. First, a concept of firm ordering
based on posted wage will be introduced. The algorithm is then cast in terms of movement
along the queue generated by such an ordering. The initial system over the countably infinite
equations of the graph degree distribution will be reduced into a system of two partial
differential equations which pin down firm and worker matching prospects in equilibrium.
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1.3.1 Firm Ordering
In order to execute the algorithm, a concept of firm ordering needs to be established. The
ordering describes the preference given to firms in their decision-making process, meaning
a higher-order firm’s decision will always take precedent over a lower. Simply, the ordering
of firms is determined by their wage.
Let F (w) represent the CDF of wages posted by firms in equilibrium and let w(F )
represent its inverse. If F (w) is continuous at a point w, a measure 0 set of firms is choosing
and therefore a firm with wage w faces a zero probability of a rival claim to a given worker.
However, if a mass point exists in F (w) and two or more firms covet the same worker, it is
assumed the worker chooses randomly between them. However, this cannot occur according
to the following,
Proposition 1.3.1. F (w) contains no mass points
Proof. Suppose F contains a mass point at w and consider a firm with a preferred candidate.
Because there is a positive measure of firms choosing along with this firm, they face a non-
zero probability p of losing this preferred candidate through randomization; while, a wage
w+ ε would have guaranteed recruitment for any ε > 0. Taking expectations implies there
is a discontinuous gain and ∃ε that is a profitable deviation.
The matching algorithm, in order to generate a pairwise-stable matching, can be
understood to progress sequentially along the ordering generated by wages. Starting at
F = 1 and progressing downward in the rankings to 0, all firms posting a wage of w(F )
make their selection of their preferred candidate from amongst their available connections
(if any).
The firm ranking F as a state variable in the algorithm can therefore be thought
of, in one interpretation, as similar to time in a differential equation–where each period is
enacted internally in continuous time progression from F = 1 to 0. Of course this is just an
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interpretation of the device used to generate the calculation of the pairwise stable matching
and need not be taken explicitly.
1.3.2 Preliminaries to the Algorithm
Before describing the algorithm, several objects need to be posited which will be identified
as equilibrium objects by the firm and worker problems later in the paper.
The first of these is
¯
a(F ), which gives the lowest overall quality worker that a firm at
queue rank F would consider hiring; that is, it is its reservation quality. Obversely,
¯
F (a)
gives the lowest-ranked firm a worker of ability level a would be willing to accept. This
immediately implies that w(
¯
F (a)) is worker a’s reservation wage.
If the production function y(a, x) is increasing in a, then
¯
F (a) is increasing and
therefore can be inverted for a¯(F ), the highest ability worker willing to accept an offer from
firm rank F (and wage w(F )). It will be convention for the algorithm that those workers
whose reservation wage has passed will exit the matching market and their links will be
destroyed.
Lastly, let u(a, F ) represent the remaining measure of unemployed workers of ability
level a after all firms with efficiency greater than F have moved. And let the total number of
links possessed by workers (and firms through market clearing) at a point F in the algorithm
be given by the function
z˜(F ) =
∫ a¯(F )
¯
a
z(s)u(s, F )ds
1.3.3 The Algorithm
Given the policy rules
¯
F and
¯
a this subsection will describe the allocation that occurs from
the pairwise stable matching algorithm. It will first describe the firm’s side of the algorithm.
Firms will possess at any given queue position a certain number of potential connections
with workers. As firms above a given firm move, these connections will disappear as either
other firms steal workers, or the workers exit because their reservation wage has passed.
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After describing the degree distribution of active connections, I will detail the firm’s
problem. This will provide conditions under which the wage posted by a firm is increasing
in its efficiency–meaning more efficient firms post higher wages. Therefore, efficiency, wage,
and queue order are all monotonically related, and efficiency may serve as a sufficient
statistic for queue order. The firm’s side of the algorithm will deliver the equilibrium
distribution over the best candidate that a firm can expect to hire from their basket.
The workers’ side of the algorithm will be described after the firms’. Workers similarly
will have a degree distribution, or distribution over active connections to firms. They will
be hired by a given firm if their overall quality is the highest in that firm’s basket, and
that quality is above the firm’s reservation quality. The result of the worker’s side of the
matching algorithm will be a partial differential equation that describes the instantaneous
probability of a worker of ability a of being hired at the queue position of firm efficiency x.
This will combine with the condition on firm’s expectations to fully describe the dynamics
of the matching algorithm.
1.3.3.1 The Firm Side
Let φ(t, F ) = {φi(t, F )} describe the probability mass of number of active connections
of a firm of type t after all Fˆ ∈ [F, 1] firms have made their selections, also known as
the conditional degree distribution. So for example, the initial distribution is given by
φi(t, 1) = e
−r ri
i! , or the Poisson pmf.
The following proposition shows that φ() will be identical for all firms remaining in
the algorithm by showing the three conditions that pin down its dynamics are identical for
those firms.
Proposition 1.3.2. φ(t, F ) = φ(F ) ∀t ≤ F
Proof. Let t1, t2 < F be two ranks lower than the currently choosing one. φ(t1, 1) = φ(t2, 1)
by assumption. Further, the distribution over ability of t1 and t2’s basket is independent
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of their type by assumption. Lastly, firm selection of candidates does not condition on
candidate’s connections to other firms ⇒
∂φ
∂F
(t1, F ) =
∂φ
∂F
(t2, F )
As a result, separate distributions need not be considered for each firm rank. Therefore
let q(F ) represent the common, instantaneous rate of link destruction for firms who have
not moved yet, meaning the unconditional rate at which a firm’s connections disappear as
higher-ranked firms move. The sources of link destruction are twofold: the rate at which
workers are stolen by firms of a higher wage, and the number of workers who exit the market
because their reservation rank
¯
F has passed.
The evolution of the distribution φ can be described via the differential equation
φ˙j(F ) = [jφj(F )− (j + 1)φj+1(F )]q(F )
For an infinitesimal change in the queue, each bin in the degree distribution sees an
inflow from the bin above it equal to (j + 1)φj+1(w)q(w) which is the rate at which the
remaining firms lose their j + 1 links times the measure in that bin. Similarly, the bin at
j loses its own denizens at an analogous rate times its own measure. Putting these two
together yields the differential equation above.
These differential equations over all j create a countably infinite system of linear
differential equations in the instantaneous link destruction rate q(w). It can be represented
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in matrix notation as
φ˙(F )′ = φ(F )′

−q(F ) 0 0 0
2q(F ) −2q(F ) 0 0
0 3q(F ) −3q(F ) 0
0 0 ... ...

which is a state-dependent, continuous-time, infinite, non-homogeneous Markov chain where
the states are the bins in the degree distribution given by the vector φ(F ).
Proposition 1.3.3. Let q˜(F ) =
∫ 1
F q(t)dt. When the initial degree distribution is Poisson
with rate r, the firms’ degree distribution for the matching algorithm is given by
φj(F ) =
(re−q˜(F ))j
j!
e−re
−q˜(F )
Proof. By direct inspection
If a more constructive proof is desired, one can use the matrix exponential form from
the Markov Process. Note that the degree distribution of links over firms remains Poisson
throughout the algorithm, with the rate parameter now given by re−q˜(F ), that is, initial
rate degraded by outflows.
For now, assume that there exists a distribution over ability level for all of the extant
links in the algorithm at any given position F in the algorithm. That is, there exists a
function H˜(a, F ) with support [
¯
a, a¯] which gives the probability that a randomly selected
connection between a worker and a firm will have a quality less than or equal to a after all
firms above F have made their decision.
Consider a firm that has i active links and is making its decision about whom to
hire from its available pool of i workers. The distribution describing the talent level of the
best of these i workers, otherwise known as the ith order statistic, is given by H˜(a, F )i.
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Therefore, putting this together with the derived degree distribution for firms, the expected
pseudo distribution from which a firm will hire its worker at queue position F conditional
on having at least one connection and choosing the best available worker is given by
H(a, F ) =
∑
i
φi(F )H˜(a, F )
i
= e−re
−q˜(F ) ∑
i
(re−q˜(F )H˜(a, F ))i
i!
= e−r(1−H˜(a,F ))e
−q˜(F )
The program of a firm with efficiency level x can now be given. A matched firm with
efficiency x, quality q and wage w produces the following lifetime value function:
Jm(x, q, w) =
y(x, q)− w
1− β(1− δ)
Therefore, the program of an unmatched firm with efficiency x is given by:
J(x) = max
q,F
β
[∫ ∞
q
y(x, s)− w(F )
1− β(1− δ) dH(s, F ) +H(q, x)(1− δf )Jt+1(x)
]
The firm has two choices to make. The first involves the lowest quality match it would
accept. The second is the position in the queue that the firm would like to occupy. The
cost for slotting at the queue position F is that the firm must post the wage w(F ), or the
quantile of F , that guarantees it is the F th ranked firm in the wage distribution.
In order to make x a sufficient statistic, it is required that the decision rule F (x) is
increasing; that is, the queue position chosen by a firm is an increasing function of their
efficiency level. The following proof establishes this as the case for a production function of
the form y(x, a) = xαa1−α. Any CES production function with a lower elasticity will then
obtain as well.
Proposition 1.3.4. if y(x, a) = xαa1−α, F (x) is increasing.
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Proof. Suppose there are x < x′ s.t. F (x) = F > F (x′) = F ′.
⇒ J(x′, F ) > J(x′, F ) and J(x, F ) > J(x, F ′)
⇐⇒ J(x′, F )− J(x, F ) < J(x′, F ′)− J(x, F ′)
⇐⇒ ∫∞
¯
q (x
′ − x)sdH(s, F ) < ∫∞
¯
q′ (x
′ − x)sdH(s, F )
⇐⇒ ∫∞
¯
q sdH(s, F ) <
∫∞
¯
q′ sdH(s, F )
⇐⇒ J(x, F ′) > J(x, F ) ⇒⇐
.
Given a function that ensures a monotonic queue decision rule, the firm’s efficiency
can then serve as the sufficient statistic for the state of both the wage distribution and the
queue order as the algorithm progresses. Thus, take w(x) = w(F (x)) to be the wage posted
by firm x, F (x) to be the queue position of firm x, and H(a, x) = H(a, F (x)) to be the
quality pseudo-distribution that firm x guarantees itself by obtaining queue position F .
The firm’s side of the algorithm delivers the distribution H(a, x) that is faced by the
average firm of a given efficiency x. The next section will use this equilibrium object to
determine how workers outflow from the market. It will first demonstrate that the object
H(a, x) is an exponential of the total mass of links with quality above the worker’s ability a.
Then, it will use this fact to deliver a two-equation system of partial differential equations
that determine the instantaneous probability of being hired throughout the algorithm.
1.3.3.2 Workers
Workers who are still in the market maintain a set of active links from which they could
potentially be hired. On the other end of any of these links is a firm also connected to other
workers.
Consider a given position in the queue, x. At that position, an instantaneous propor-
tion of f(x)F (x) links are being actively considered by firms. Now consider a worker of ability
a amongst those being actively considered. Then the probability that the worker is the
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preferred candidate is
∑
i≥1 φi(x)iH˜(a, x)
i−1∑
i≥1 φi(x)
= e−r(1−H˜(aξ,x)e
−q˜(x)
= H(a, x)
The worker considers the distribution over how many other links the firms might be
connected to, and the probability that any of those other connections is owned by a worker
of higher ability. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this hiring probability is exactly the first order
pseudo-distribution that firms expect when entering the market.
Let p(a, x) represent the instantaneous probability of any of a worker’s links being
converted into a job offer, this probability is given as
p(a, x) =

f(x)H(a,x)
x a ≥ ¯a(x)
0 o.w.
with the complementary rate that a link does not yield a hire and is destroyed given by:
γ(a, F ) =

1− f(x)H(a,x)x a < ¯a(x)
1 o.w.
Then the following differential equations represent the measure of unemployed workers
of ability level a with j active connections to firms remaining in the algorithm:
m˙j(a, x) = jmj(a, x)(p(a, x) + γ(a, x))− (j + 1)mj+1(a, x)γ(a, x)
mj(a, x¯) = ut(a)e
−z(a) z(a)j
j!
workers see outflow from having j connections equal to the sum of the rates of link
destruction and hiring, and at rate γ(a, x) they have a link destroyed and flow into the j
connection bin. The solution of this differential equation is given by
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Proposition 1.3.5. mi(a, x) is given as
mi(a, x) = ut(a)
(z(a)F (x))i
i!
e
−z(a)
[
F (x)+
∫ x¯(a)
x f(t)H(a,t)dt
]
Proof. By direct inspection
summing up the measure of workers over all bins yields the desired measure of workers
remaining of ability a at a point x in the algorithm:
Proposition 1.3.6. u(a, x) is given by
u(a, x) = ut(a)e
− z(a)
v
∫ x¯(a)
x v(t)H(a,t)dt
The remaining measure of unemployed of ability a outflow at a rate given by the
expected number of links they received, times the product of their rank in the first order
distribution H(a, x) with the probability mass of vacancies at x.
As stated previously, at any point in the algorithm, the number of links possessed by
firms and workers must add up, this can now be precisely given by the following condition:
vF (x)
∑
i
φi(x)i =
∫ a¯(x)
¯
a
∑
j
mj(s, x)ds
⇒ vre−q˜(x) =
∫ a¯(x)
¯
a
z(s)u(s, x)ds
Returning now to the first order distribution in order to close the algorithm. Recall
that H˜(a, x) was the distribution of ability over links from whence the first order distribution
was derived. This can now be defined as
H˜(a, x) =
∫ a
¯
a z(s)u(s, x)ds∫ a¯(x)
¯
a z(s)u(s, x)ds
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which, when plugged into the earlier derived expression for the first order distribution gives
H(a, x) = e−r(1−H˜(a,x))e
−q˜(x)
= e−
1
v
∫ a¯(x)
a z(s)u(s,x)ds
The pseudo probability that the ability of the best expected candidate of a firm is less than
or equal to a is a negative exponential of the ratio of the mass of links of greater ability
than a to the mass of firms remaining in the market.
Note that the term in the exponential has a similar flavor to the vacancy unemploy-
ment ratio from search and matching models, and in some sense captures the ”tightness”
of the market, modified to include the number of links that workers possess. In fact, were
search behavior to be identical for all workers, such that z(a) = z, the term would be exactly
F (x)z
∫ a¯(x)
a u(s, x)ds
F (x)v
= F (x)z
U(x)
V (x)
The two objects thus identified, H(a,x) and u(a,x), sufficiently describe the execution
of the matching algorithm and the expectations of workers and firms respectively about
their prospects in the search-and-matching market. Differentiating these two objects with
respect to a and x respectively yields the following system of partial differential equations
Ha(a, x) =
z(a)
v
H(a, x)u(a, x)
ux(a, x) =
z(a)v(x)
v
H(a, x)u(a, x)
(1.1)
with boundary condition for H given by H(a¯(x), x) = 1 and the boundary condition for u
to be given later in the equilibrium section.
Proposition 1.3.7. The matching algorithm is pairwise stable
Proof. Assume a putative, preferred bilateral deviation by x, a. x could have chosen a with
acceptance but did not. ⇒⇐
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1.4 Existence, Uniqueness and Topology of Equilibrium
The matching algorithm describes the microstructure of the matching market, and this
section will incorporate that microstructure into a dynamic, general equilibrium framework.
The equilibrium will exhibit a block structure, and its existence and uniqueness will be
established in a manner corresponding to that block structure.
1.4.1 Workers
Workers can be either employed or unemployed. If employed, a worker is paid their con-
tracted wage until the match is separated and they rejoin the pool of unemployed, implying
a value function for a contracted worker of
Vt(a,w) = w + βE [(1− δ)Vt+1(a,w) + δUt+1(a)]
An unemployed worker engages in home production in the beginning of a period.
They can then engage in costly search, hoping to secure a job for the following period but
must pay a cost given by ξ(z) in order to search with intensity z. As seen in the matching
algorithm section, the mass of workers that remains after all firms above x have moved is
given by u(a, x), then n(a, x) = u(a, x)/ut(a) is the probability that a worker of ability a
remains unemployed. The worker’s problem can then be stated as
Ut(a) = b− ξ(z) + max
z,x
βE
[∫ x¯(a)
x
Vt+1(a,w(t))d[n(a, t)] + n(a, F (x))Ut+1(a)
]
The optimal policy for a reservation level for a worker is given by
¯
x(a) = inf{x : Vt+1(a,w(x)) ≥ Ut+1(a)}
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which implies a worker will accept a wage up until they are indifferent between accepting
that wage and returning to unemployment.
For z(a), the policy rule is given implicitly by
−z(a)β
∫ x¯(a)
¯
x(a)
Vt+1(a,w(t))d[n(a, t) lnn(a, t)] = ξ
′(z(a))
. Here the worker trades off the cost of engaging in extra search relative to the improvement
in their employment prospects, given the behavior of all other agents.
In any steady state equilibrium, Vt = V, Ut = U ∀t, and these reduce to
V (a,w) =
1
β˜
[w + βδU(a)]
⇒U(a) = 1
β˜
[1/β + δ − n(a,
¯
x(a))]−1
[
β˜
β
b− ξ(z) +
∫ F¯ (a)
F (R)
w(t)d[n(a, t)]
]
while the policy rules are
¯
x :
¯
x(a) = inf{x : w(x) ≥ (1− β)U(a)}
z : −z(a)β
∫ x¯(a)
¯
x(a)
w(t)d[n(a, t) lnn(a, t)] =
β˜
β
ξ′(z(a))
1.4.2 Firms
The program of a firm can now be restated from the matching algorithm section in terms
of efficiencies. A firm of type x solves the objective function given by:
J(x) = max
a,x˜
β
[∫ a¯(x)
a
y(x, s)− w(x˜)
1− β(1− δ) dH(s, x˜) +H(a, x˜)(1− δf )Jt+1(x)
]
. A firm chooses their reservation ability a and which type they would like to try to mimic
in the queue, x˜. Of course in the increasing wage equilibria sought here, it will be the
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case that x˜ = x. Where the wage distribution is differentiable, the condition governing the
optimal wage policy of firms–after steady state conditions have been imposed and a healthy
serving of algebra–is given by:
w′(x) = −
∫ a¯(x)
¯
a(x) ya(x, s)Hx(s, x)ds
1−H(
¯
a(x), x)
(1.2)
Hx is the derivative ofH with respect to firm type x (and queue position modulo a constant),
and is therefore an expression of how the distribution of best-available workers improves as
one moves up the queue. Ergo, it captures in the wage-equilibrium condition the benefits
of posting a higher wage in terms of the improvement of the talent pool a firm can recruit
from. Differentiating H(a, x) yields Hx as:
Hx(a, x) = −
[
z(a¯(x))
v
u(a¯(x), x)a¯′(x)− 1
v
∫ a¯(x)
a
z(s)ux(s, x)ds
]
H(a, x)
There are two sources of improvement in the talent pool present in this derivative. The
first term in brackets represents the improvement in the upper bound of the support of the
distribution. When firms increase their wages, they increase the best quality worker that
would be willing to accept them as an employer. Call this effect the acceptance effect.
The second term in brackets represents the marginal improvement in the quality of
remaining workers in the pool when moving up the queue–workers of type a are flowing out
of the market at rate ux(a, x). Call this effect the competition effect.
The firm, then, chooses their queue position to optimally trade off the benefit of
moving up the queue–given by the expectation of the improvement in the marginal product
of workers recruitable by the firm from both the acceptance and competition effect–against
the costs of doing so, represented simply by the wage.
To complete the firm’s wage policy, a boundary condition needs to be imposed on the
wage differential equation. This can be done in one of two ways. Either a minimum wage is
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imposed
¯
w, or a condition requiring that the lowest paying firm has no incentive to deviate
downward in wage. I will assume for now a binding minimum wage policy
¯
w posted by the
lowest ranked firm.
The reservation policy of the firm is straightforward, given by
y(x, a¯(x))− w(x) = β˜(1− δf )J(x)
. The firm is willing to accept a worker up until the point where the gains from waiting
and searching again are larger than employing that worker.
1.4.3 Equilibrium
The last element of the model that needs to be pinned down prior to defining equilibrium
is the transition of states between periods.
The remaining mass of unemployed workers of type a after the matching market is
concluded is given by u(a,
¯
x(a)), while (u(a, x¯(a))−u(a,
¯
x(a)) have transitioned to employ-
ment. Obversely, (ω(a)−u(a, x¯(a)) is the mass of ability a that starts a period employed, δ
of which lose their job and enter the unemployment pool for the next period. (Recall that
ω describes the distribution over talent in the unit population of workers) Therefore, the
steady state condition governing worker flows is given by
uss(a) = u(a, x¯) =
δω(a) + u(a,
¯
x)
1 + δ
For firms, an inflow of v¯ new vacancies enter the matching market in any period,
distributed over efficiencies by the function λ(x). 1−H(
¯
a(x), x) of these firms fail to find a
match, of which δf are destroyed. Therefore the steady state of the law of motion for firm
measures is given by
v(x) =
v¯λ(x)
1−H(
¯
a(x))
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.An Equilibrium for the model can now be defined.
Definition 1.4.1. A stationary equilibrium of the model is defined as: Value functions
J, U, V ; policy functions
¯
x(a), z(a) for the workers and w(x),
¯
a(x) for the firms; measures
H(a, x), u(a, x), v(x) governing the populations of agents such that
1. w(x),
¯
a(x) solves the firm’s problem given distributions and policy rules
2.
¯
x(a), z(a) solve the worker’s problem given distributions and policy rules
3. H(a, x), u(a, x) solve (1.1), given
¯
a(x),
¯
x(a), z(a), with boundary conditions consis-
tent with functions uss(a), v(x)
1.4.4 Existence, Uniqueness and Topology
The structure of the equilibrium will exhibit a block-like nature–with discontinuities or
non-differentiabilites being propagated downward throughout the matching market.
To begin, a condition describing the local differential equation of worker reservation
policy to match that of the firm needs to be derived. Differentiating the worker’s policy
function gives
(
1
β
+ δ − n(a,
¯
x))w′(
¯
x(a))
¯
x′(a) = −
∫ x¯(a)
¯
x(a)
w′(t)na(a, t)dt
The worker’s reservation rule
¯
x(a) reflects the relationship between the improving prospects
of a worker as ability increases and the change in their reservation wage.
na(a, t) represents how a worker’s prospects improve in the matching market as their
ability improves. Differentiating n(a, x) gives
na(a, x) =
[
−z(a)v(x¯(a))
v
H(a, x¯(a))x¯′(a)− z(a)
v
∫ x¯(a)
x
v(t)Ha(a, t)dt
]
n(a, x)
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. Similar to the firm’s rule, there are two effects present. The first term in brackets gives
the acceptance effect for the worker. As ability improves, the highest efficiency firm that
would be willing to hire the worker improves by x¯′(a), while a worker’s chance of being
the best candidate for that firm is H(a, x¯(a)). The second term represents the competition
effect for the worker, as their ability improves they marginally improve their prospects over
Ha(a, t) measure of candidates. Note the above does not contain the marginal effect from
on z(a) as this cancels with the cost of that search in the worker’s problem.
The above differential equation, when paired with the firm’s similar reservation equa-
tion, will describe a system of ordinary differential equations for the acceptance regions of
the agents in the model. However, as will be shown in the following section, the accep-
tance effects–being composed of the reservation rules of agents “above” the current state
in the matching algorithm–will introduce non-differential points. Therefore the equilibrium
existence will have to be proven piece-wise, which is done in the following section.
1.4.4.1 Existence and Topology
Define finite subdivisions of the firm efficiency support and worker ability support in the
following way. Initialize via
xNx = x¯
aNa = a¯
and
xNx−1 = ¯
x(a¯)
aNa−1 = ¯
a(x¯)
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. Then define the subdivision iteratively via:
xi = max{
¯
x(
¯
a(xi+2)),
¯
x}
ai = max{
¯
a(
¯
x(ai+2)),
¯
a}
Consider the highest ability worker a¯. This worker will choose a reservation firm
¯
x(a¯) < x¯. Now consider the interval INx−1 = [xNx−1 , xNx ]. Within this interval, firms
can feasibly hire from any of the available population given a connection, as a¯ = a¯(x).
Presupposing a boundary condition at
¯
wNx = ¯
x(a¯), the following proposition holds
Proposition 1.4.2. Given
¯
wNx a unique solution to the wage equation exists on INx.
Proof. By the Picard-Lindelo¨f Theorem
Next, consider a second interval in the efficiency support of firms given by INx−2 =
[xNx−2, xNx−1]. As stated earlier, the policy function ¯
x(a) is increasing, therefore a¯(x) is
increasing in equilibrium. Employ a change of variables to invert the condition describing
worker reservation values as
a¯′(x) =
(1/β + δ − n(a¯(x), x))w′(x)
− ∫ x¯(a¯(x))x w′(t)na(a¯(x), t)dt (1.3)
Let xNx−2 be given by max{¯x, {x : a¯(x) = aNa−1}}, and suppose a boundary condition
given by w¯Nx−2, then the following proposition holds:
Proposition 1.4.3. Given w¯Nx−2 and w on subdomain INx−1 a unique solution (w(x), a¯)
exists that solves the ODE system given by 1.2 and 1.3
Proof. By the Picard-Lindelo¨f Theorem
.
While the above proposition might seem to imply that a continuous policy function
for wages is assured on the interval INx−2, this turns out to not necessarily be the case.
26
It remains to be shown that the solution to the ODE system is in fact increasing in both
variables, as was assumed at the outset. The following proposition details the necessary
and sufficient condition for the equilibrium wage function to be continuous at x∗
Proposition 1.4.4. The equilibrium policies are continuous at xNx−1 = x∗ ⇐⇒
∫ x¯
x∗
w′(t)(n(a¯, t)(1− n(a¯, t))dt > (1/β + δ − n(a¯, x∗))n(a¯, x∗)
∫ a¯(x∗)
¯
a(x∗) ya(s, x)H(s, x)ds
1−H(
¯
a(x∗), x∗)
Proof: See appendix.
To see when this will obtain, rewrite the coupled ODE system as
J(a¯, w)
w′
a¯′
 = G(a¯, w)
then, w′ and a¯′ are positive iff the above proposition holds, which is merely a condition on
the determinant of J(a¯, w).
The intuition for the proof is the following. At x∗, the acceptance effect begins to be in
effect for firms–the best candidate they can hire begins to degrade. This gives an increased
incentive, in equilibrium, for wages to fall as the queue progresses. However falling wages
feed back into the acceptance effect, such that w′, a¯′ are determined by the ODE system.
If the feedback effects are too strong, it can be impossible for an infinitesimal change in both
wages and a¯′ to be consistent with equilibrium, so that a discontinuity in w must occur.
What a discontinuity in w(x) implies is that the wage pdf, f(w) has a gap in it where
w(x) is discontinuous. The implication is that at these points, workers are sorted into
classes–or tiers–with stark differences in wages between them. We will see in the computa-
tional section that these equilibria are actually quite common for reasonable calibrations of
the model, and that sorting into tiers is generally the norm. That this granularity emerges
from an otherwise continuous model is somewhat surprising.
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Figure 1.2: Example Solution
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1.5 Computation
This section describes the computational methods used to find an approximate solution to
the equilibrium conditions. As noted in the section on the topology of the equilibrium, the
{ai} and {xj} points represent non-differentiable points in the model. This fact, combined
with the need to impose boundary conditions in a dynamic general equilibrium framework,
necessitate a global solution method that can account for multiple subdomains. Pseudospec-
tral element methods are an ideal choice because of their amendability so such problems,
and because of their ease of numerical integration.
To give a sense of what kind of computational problem the equilibrium approximation
represents, Figure 1.2 plots an example acceptance region and surface plot for the u(a, x)
function. The grey lines in the acceptance domain represent the non-differentiable loci
that in a sense carve up the domain endogenously. These lines, along with the boundaries
represented by the acceptance functions
¯
x and
¯
a, will represent the boundaries of the mesh
upon which the surface functions are computed.
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1.5.1 Pseudospectral Element Methods
The structure of the equilibrium–in which multiple kinks and discontinuities will be re-
flected down the algorithm–requires a flexible computational approach to approximate.
This section will detail such an approach. It relies on pseudospectral element methods to
approximate both the policy functions and the surfaces of the distribution functions. The
subdomains will be determined endogenously according to the mapping of nondifferentiable
points down the matching queue. Thus, this section might be of interest to those looking
to approximate diffeo-algebraic equations on a flexible grid.
Pseudospectral methods involve approximating a function by assuming a projection
onto a functional basis. In this paper, I will be employing the basis of Chebyshev poly-
nomials. I will give a brief overview of the details of this method, but refer the interested
reader to Judd (1998) for a cursory introduction for economists, or Kopriva (2009) for a
more thorough coverage of the methods used here.
Chebyshev approximation involves approximating a function via
f(x) =
∑
i
ciψi(x)
where ψi are the Chebyshev polynomials of the first kind and ci are the weights on those
polynomials. Chebyshev polynomials have nice properties of orthogonality, meaning, among
other things, that they provide a good approximating basis.
For the decision rules, the model requires approximating Na − 1 policy rules for the
workers, on the intervals defined by the partitioning algorithm that gives {ai}. Similarly,
the firm’s decision rules will be demarcated along a grid defined by the Nx − 1 intervals
[xi, xi + 1]. Because Chebyshev approximations need to be fit on the unit interval, this
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suggests the following approximation scheme for the decision rules:
¯
x(a) = γ(q(a)) =
∑
i
cgiψi(q(a))
q(a) =
a− ai
ai+1 − ai
where the cgi determine the weights and q(a) maps to the unit interval. z(a) can be defined
similarly.
Firms’ rules are approximated in a similar way on a given interval, with
w(x) = υ(r(x)) =
∑
i
cwiψi(r(x))
r(x) =
x− xi
xi+1 − xi
The surface distributions are also approximated with chebyshev polynomials. This is
accomplished via tensors of the single dimension polynomials, e.g.
f(x, y) =
∑
i
∑
j
cijψi(x)ψj(y)
.
The mapping of the surfaces to squares, however, is slightly more complicated than
with the decision rules, because the domain on which they are defined is sometimes bounded
by the rules themselves–leading to endogenously-defined non-square surfaces. In order to
map the subdomains for these functions to the square, two types of mappings and their
relevant jacobians will be used. A vertical stretch mapping will map the bottom and top
boundaries–defined by curves–to the bottom and top of the square; while the horizontal
stretch will do the same for the right and left boundaries. In the case where the bounded
subdomain is three-sided, either mapping can be used, with a mapping between the corner
singularity and a new side. Methods exist to make the mapping of triangle-like subdomains
more efficient, (see Taylor et al. (2001) for an overview) however their implementation
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appeared to have little effect.
First define the mapping to a square for a rectangular surface defined by [ai, ai+1]×
[xj , xj+1] via
q(a, x) =
a− ai
ai+1 − ai r(a, x) =
x− xj
xj+1 − xj
Now, suppose a surface is bounded by the rules
¯
a(x) along its lower boundary and
a¯(x) with x ∈ [xj , xj+1] along its top boundary. Define the vertical stretch mapping as
q(a, x) =
a−
¯
a(x)
a¯(x)−
¯
a(x)
r(a, x) =
x− xj
xj+1 − xj
. This will map the subdomain on which the surface is defined onto the square by stretching
it vertically according to the decision rules that bound it.
Alternatively, invert the bounding functions for
¯
x(a) and x¯(a) with a ∈ [ai, ai+1].
Define the horizontal stretch mapping as
q(a, x) =
a− ai
ai+1 − ai r(a, x) =
x−
¯
x(a)
x¯(a)−
¯
x(a)
. This will map the subdomain on which the surface is defined onto the square by instead
stretching it horizontally. All three of these mappings will be used to approximate the
surfaces depending on how it is bounded and which decision rules are being updated and
therefore how the surfaces need be numerically integrated.
Given an appropriate mapping to the square, the surface functions can then be ap-
proximated as as
H(a, x) = B(q(a, x), r(a, x)) =
∑
i
∑
j
cbijψi(q)ψj(r)
u(a, x) = D(q(a, x), r(a, x)) =
∑
i
∑
j
cdijψi(q)ψj(r)
.
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Obtaining approximations is then a matter of defining an appropriate concept of a
residual and minimizing that residual according to a chosen method. In this paper I will
minimize the residual at collocation points given by the Gauss-Chebyshev points of the
interval or surface in question.
The residuals for the surface functions are given by the PDE system that resulted
from the matching algorithm, given the decision rules of the firms and workers. For the
vertical stretch mapping, these are given by
GD ≡Dr(q, r) 1
∆x
−Dq(q, r)
(
q∆a
γ′(q(a¯(x)))(a¯(x)−
¯
a(x))
+
(1− q)α′(r)
δx(a¯(x)−
¯
a(x)
)
− z(a(c, r))v(r)
v
D(q, r)B(q, r)
GB ≡Bc(q, r) 1
a¯(x)−
¯
a(x)
− z(a(c, r))v(r)
v
D(q, r)B(q, r)
where subscripts denote derivatives wrt that variable. These residuals come from the re-
quired change of variables to map the surface PDE to the square. The horizontal stretch
mappings are given similarly as
GD ≡ Dr − z(a(c, r))v(r)
v
DB(x¯(a)−
¯
x(a))
GB ≡ Bc 1
∆a
−Br
(
r∆x
α′(r(x¯(a)))(x¯(a)−
¯
x(a))
+
(1− r)γ′(c)
∆a(x¯(a)−
¯
x(a))
)
− z(a(c, r))v(r)
v
DB
.
1.5.1.1 Collocation
Approximation will be obtained by miniziming the equilibrium residuals at collocation
points given by Nc+1 Gauss-Chebyshev points. These points are defined as
xj = cos
(j − 1/2)pi
N
0 ≤ j ≤ Nc
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where Nc is chosen to provide an adequate level of accuracy and represents the order of
the highest level of Chebyshev polynomial used. The Gauss-Chebyshev points represent
the roots of this highest order polynomial, and minimizing at these points yields a nonlin-
ear system of Nc+1 residual equations and Nc+1 unknown weights {ci} for the univariate
functions, and N2c+1 residual equations and N
2
c+1 unknown weights {cij} for the bivariate
surface equations.
While methods exist to collocate on sparser grids, e.g. Judd et al. (2014), there
are two reasons not to do so here. First is that numerical integration for the decision
rules will occur along the lines defined by the tensor product of the subdomain, so the
highest possible accuracy is ensured when the full tensor product is used. Second, as we
will see, the factorizations of the matrices representing the chebyshev polynomials at the
Gauss-Chebyshev points can be precomputed when the full tensor product is used–greatly
increasing the speed of computation by removing the need to invert large matrices.
The matrix of 2N2c+1 residual equations for the distribution surfaces can be written
as
Adr ◦Dr +Adc ◦Dc +Ad ◦D ◦B
Abr ◦Br +Abc ◦Bc +Ab ◦D ◦B
where ◦ represents the Hadamard product and the A matrices are defined according to
the appropriate mapping. Let Ψ represent the matrix of elements ψij = ψi(xj) Chebyshev
values at the Gauss-Chebyshev points and Ψ˜ their derivatives. Further, let CD and CB
represent the coefficient matrices for D and B respectively, with typical element cij . Then
the residual equations can be rewritten as
Adr ◦Ψ′CDΨ˜ +Adc ◦ Ψ˜′CDΨ +Ad ◦Ψ′CDΨ ◦Ψ′CBΨ
Abr ◦Ψ′CBΨ˜ +Abc ◦ Ψ˜′CBΨ +Ab ◦Ψ′CDΨ ◦Ψ′CBΨ
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These equations should be put into a vector format in order to run a Newton-Raphson
method on them, and this will be done in a manner that makes the Jacobian easy to invert.
Taking the transpose of the above equations, and applying the vec operation will yield
adr ◦Ψ′ ⊗ Ψ˜′cd + adc ◦ Ψ˜′ ⊗Ψ′cd + ad ◦Ψ′ ⊗Ψ′cd ◦Ψ′ ⊗Ψ′cb
abr ◦Ψ′ ⊗ Ψ˜′cb + abc ◦ Ψ˜′ ⊗Ψ′cb + ab ◦Ψ′ ⊗Ψ′cd ◦Ψ′ ⊗Ψ′cb
where ⊗ is the kronecker product, cd = vec(C ′D) and cb = vec(C ′B). This uses the relation
that vec(ABC) = (C ′⊗A)B. The mapping is now rendered into a vector of N2c+1 residuals.
The Jacobian of this system can be written in block form as
AdrΨ′ ⊗ Ψ˜′ +AdcΨ˜′ ⊗Ψ′ +AbdΨ′ ⊗Ψ′ −AddΨ′ ⊗Ψ′
−AbbΨ′ ⊗Ψ′ AbrΨ′ ⊗ Ψ˜′ +AbcΨ˜′ ⊗Ψ′ +AdbΨ′ ⊗Ψ′

where now the coefficient matrices areN2c+1×N2c+1 diagonal matrices withAdb = diag(vec(D)◦
ad) etc.
The above Jacobian is 2N2c+1 × 2N2c+1, which can end up being a very large matrix
for reasonable values of Nc. However, this is mitigated by some attractive properties of
Chebyshev polynomials at Gauss-Chebyshev points. Ψ and Ψ˜ can both be decomposed via
LQ factorization on the same orthogonal basis Q as Ψ′ = LQ and Ψ˜ = L˜Q where L, L˜ are
lower triangular matrices. Further, the kronecker product implies Ψ′⊗Ψ = (L⊗L)(Q⊗Q).
As shorthand, let LL = L⊗ L and QQ = Q⊗Q, then we can rewrite the Jacobian as
AdrLL˜+AdcL˜L+AbdLL −AddLL
−AbbLL AbrLL˜+AbcL˜L+AdbLL

QQ 0
0 QQ

. The matrix on the right is orthogonal and therefore easily invertible. The left matrix is
block-lower-triangular. After accounting for the top right block via block inversion, it can
be solved via forward propagation. Therefore, an expensive O((2N2c+1)
3) computation need
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not be computed when solving the system of equations for a Newton-Raphson method.
1.5.1.2 Row Computation
The boundary conditions on the surface functions mean that the surface functions cannot
be solved in isolation on their subdomains. Via the original PDE system, the boundary
conditions imply that the H function must match its neighbors above and below along their
shared boundaries, while the u function must match the left and right boundaries, with the
added condition that the left and rightmost boundaries of any horizontal section, or “row”,
must accord with the steady state labor characterization.
This structure–where the left-right boundaries “wrap” around the surface imply that
computing the surface functions iteratively by rows will be an ideal iterative method. At
each row, the bottom boundary of B, or the ability first-order distribution, will be fed to
the following row to serve as the top boundary.
This concludes the computation of the distribution surfaces. The next subsection will
document how to update the worker and firm decision rules given the surface values.
1.5.1.3 Worker Updates
The worker’s problem requires the calculation of several numerical integrals over the regions
of their potential hiring. Luckily, approximations via Chebyshev polynomials provide an
easy method for doing so at the collocation points by integrating the polynomials themselves.
Restating the differential equation from the worker’s problem:
(
1
β
+ δ − n(a,
¯
x))w′(
¯
x(a))
¯
x′(a) = −
∫ x¯(a)
¯
x(a)
w′(t)na(a, t)dt
. Suppose the distribution functions u and firm policy rules are given. The worker’s problem
will involve integration over M subdomains within their respective row, as defined in the
section above. Index these M subdomains with j from left to right. Then the worker’s
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condition can be rewritten at a Gauss-Chebyshev node qi as
γ′(qi) = −
∑
j=1,M ∆
2
xj
∫ 1
0 ν
′
j(r¯ + (r¯ − ¯r)t)
Dcj(qi,t)
DM (qi,1)
dt(
1
β + δ − D1(qi,0)DM (qi,1)
)
ν ′1(¯
r(qi))
. Inverting Ψ˜′ along with the boundary condition allows computation of the update cg of
the worker’s acceptance region in this interval.
1.5.1.4 Firm Updates
The firm update requires computation of numerical integrals similar to those of the worker’s
problem. Restating the differential equation for wages from the optimal firm behavior:
w′(x) = −
∫ a¯(x)
¯
a(x) ya(x, s)Hx(s, x)ds
1−H(
¯
a(x), x)
. In terms of Chebyshev polynomials, at a collocation point ri this integral is split into M
subdomains within a firm’s respective column, to wit:
ν ′(ri) =
∑M
j=1 ∆Fj
∫ 1
0 ya(x(ri), s)Brj(s, ri)ds
1−B1(0, ri)
with the boundary condition ν(0) = ν¯ provided by the column to the left. Inverting the
Chebyshev derivative matrix Ψ˜ concatenated with the boundary condition gives an update
of the cν weights. The remaining firm rules, α and v are updated to match according to
their respective equilibrium conditions.
Given the worker and firm update rules, the following algorithm gives the basic struc-
ture of the equilibrium computation. In an outer loop, the firm rules are updated to
convergence. In an inner loop, taking as given the firm rules, the distributions are first
computed taking as given all rules, then the worker rules is updated to convergence.
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Algorithm 1: Computation of Equilibrium
Result: Equilibrium
Guess single firm rule ν0;
Compute
¯
x(a¯) and split firm rule;
while |cνt − cνt−1| > ε ∀ ν do
Update all worker rules (from right to left) to convergence;
Update cνt+1 (from left to right);
t = t+1;
end
. The resulting weights approximate the equilibrium objects of the model.
1.6 Comparative Statics and Numerical Results
1.6.1 Matching Surface
In order to get a sense of the matching algorithm and especially to demonstrate the intuition
for the exit of labor force market participants, it is useful to view the distribution surfaces
on the square for alternative calibrations. Figure 1.3 shows the distribution surfaces for the
lower half of the ability support for workers–one with a relatively low search value of z = 2
for all participants and one with a relatively high level of z = 20.
When z = 20, the model surfaces are relatively flat, until a great deal of curvature
results around the line a = a¯− vU(x¯)x. This accords with intuition, and in the limit of perfect
information, we would expect all hiring to occur exactly on this line.
When z = 2, however, the surface is more “forgiving”, and the steepness–meaning the
hiring–is spread across the domain. In this world, matching is relatively noisy, and firms
and workers can match with participants that are of relatively larger difference in rank.
What this implies for the very lowest ranked of workers, that is, below vU(x¯)¯
x, is that they
have a possibility of “benefiting from noise”–they can be hired because search frictions are
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Figure 1.3: Matching Surfaces
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prohibitive enough that they can on occasion be the best available worker. When z = 20
this is clearly no longer the case–the probability of any of these workers of being hired is
essentially null, and they will have no incentive to remain in the market.
1.6.2 Comparative Statics
This section presents model statistics for various calibrations of the search costs. It will
adopt the following perfectly inelastic functional form for search costs. Workers can pay
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an ε small value to participate in the market. If they do so, they receive the marketwide
allocation of z random draws, should they not pay the cost they receive nothing. There will
be a cutoff rule which will dictate that any worker above a∗ will search and below will not.
1.6.2.1 Calibration
In order to calibrate the model I will take some parameter values from the literature and
assign others agnostically. This calibration is meant to serve as a benchmark point in the
parameter space in order to demonstrate the effects of the model more than to realistically
reflect the conditions of the US labor market–a task I leave for future work.
The model period will be one quarter. β = 0.99 to match an interest rate of 4.1%
per annum. δ is set to match the statistic found in Shimer (2012). δf is somewhat of an
ignored parameter in the literature. It is briefly mentioned in Davis et al. (2013) where it is
assumed that δ = δf . However such an assumption seems intuitively incorrect: a matched
and producing job would likely have a much higher probability of surviving and remaining
competitively viable than a vacancy that has failed to match with a candidate. For this
reason I set δf to be a good deal higher than δ, such that an unmatched vacancy has a
survival probability into the next period of 0.75.
The utility from unemployment is set agnostically at 0. It does not seem to have
outside effect on the model behavior. The distributions of ability and efficiency are both
assumed to be uniform with identical support. v¯ is set at 0.55. This is to account for
the fact that approximately half of all hires come from job-to-job transitions, meaning the
vacancy-unemployment ratio overstates the vacancies available to the unemployed.
¯
w is set
at 1 and σ = 1 to capture a reasonably strong complementarity between firm and worker
ranks.
The following table presents the calibration of baseline parameters. These parameters
will remain fixed as the model is solved over different calibrations for search costs.
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Table 1.1: Baseline Model Parameters
Parameter Value
β 0.99
δ 0.1
δf 0.25
b 0
[
¯
a, a¯] [1,2]
[
¯
x, x¯] [1,2]
v¯ 0.055
¯
w 1
σ −1
1.6.2.2 Statics
Figure 1.4 displays the increasing wage inequality generated by the model when search
frictions decline. As z increases from 3 to 16, wages at the bottom end of the distribution
(10th and 25th % ile) actually experience a slight decline in wages. Firms at the low end of
the efficiency distribution, and therefore who are targeting lower ability workers, see little
reason to raise wages as they do not see increased competition from more information.
On the other hand, workers at the 75th and 90th percentile of ability experience large
increases in wages as search frictions decline. Two effects are present here. Not only is
the wage offer distribution steepening due to increased competition (see 1.5 ); but high
ability workers are now more likely to be hired at these jobs, as the matching becomes more
narrowly sorted. These two effects combine to create large wage jumps relative to lower
ranked workers. Put bluntly, it is the most talented within the employment pool who reap
almost all of the benefits of increased matching efficiency.
Figure 1.5 depicts the wage offer function and unemployment levels for the stationary
model under two calibrations, z = 4 and z = 16. When information increases in the
matching market, the highest ranked firms increase wages to defend against firms from
below wishing to steal their preferred hire. When information is low, the probability of
finding a preferred candidate, let alone having them stolen, is low; and so the incentive to
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Figure 1.4: Wage Inequality
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Figure 1.5: Comparative Statics
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post high wages is lessened.
The second image depicts the same effect observed as on the matching surface. As in-
formation increases, the slice of the market that benefits from search noise–here the domain
bounded by the upper kinks of the two lines–is squeezed out of the market. Participants
of ability between roughly 1.35 and 1.4–representing about 5% of the market, lose their
incentive to participate and so exit.
1.7 Empirics
This section presents empirical evidence for the prediction of the model regarding labor
force participation: that labor force participation will decline in the presence of cheaper
search. It will specify a logistic regression of individual labor force exit decisions from the
CPS microdata. Identification of the effect of search efficiency of workers will be obtained
through differentials in internet job search activity at an occupational and/or industry level.
The main prediction of the model is that an increase in search efficiency at a market
level should serve to force out the lowest ranked workers–who no longer find it advantageous
to try searching. Testing this prediction requires an econometric specification that can
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include information on heterogeneity in worker rank at an individual level, as well as the
level of search efficiency at a market-wide level. Hence, let yi be a log odds metric of an
individual’s likelihood of exiting the labor force, modeled as
yi = α+ βxi + Γsm(i) ∗ ri + γsm(i) + Λzm(i) + εi
where xi is a vector of demographic characteristics, ri is a vector of individual level ranking
metrics, sm(i) is the level of search efficiency within the market that i is searching, zm(i) is
a vector of market level controls and εi is i.i.d. noise. The intent will be to assess the coeffi-
cients of Γ, which describe the effect of an interaction between market-level search efficiency
and individual level rankings on probability of labor force exit. Of course, individual rank
is not observable in the data, and so I will rely on proxy variables that are plausibly highly
correlated with the underlying rank of the worker: binary variables for young workers and
uneducated workers.
The data for fitting the above specification will come from the CPS microdata, pro-
vided by IPUMS. These data involve surveys of two four-month panels of individuals with
an 8-month gap in between. The limited panel dimension of the survey allows for tracking
of labor force transitions between employment, unemployment, and out-of-labor-force, as
well as individual-level information on worker characteristics.
The dependent variable in the econometric specification is the log odds of exiting
the labor force. As stated, labor force exit can be constructed from the CPS microdata
by tracking individuals’ labor force status, and counting as an affirmative observation any
transition from in the labor force (employed or unemployed) to out of the labor force. I run
alternate specifications of the model that consider a sample of only those unemployed in
the base year and also either employed or unemployed. Table 1.2 below shows a summary
for the individual level variables within the data set, including the dependent variable of
rates of labor force exit.
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Table 1.2: Individual Level Variables
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
exit 4,449,303 0.030 0.169 0 1
age 4,449,303 41.505 10.955 22 60
hs dropout 4,449,303 0.071 0.257 0 1
no college 4,449,303 0.559 0.496 0 1
male 4,449,303 0.523 0.499 0 1
white 4,449,303 0.819 0.385 0 1
Mar. Stat. 4,449,303 0.597 0.491 0 1
In order to identify the effect of cheap search in the CPS data, I turn to a recently
added Internet and Computer Use supplement. This supplement asks broad questions about
computer use at home and at work, including a question about whether the respondent used
the internet to search for a job within the past 6 months. Aggregating the proportion of
responses of this internet search variable allows construction of the sm(i) variable from the
econometric specification and captures the amount of cheap search within the marketplace
that the worker is searching. Therefore, sm(i) represents the proportion of workers within
a market who are using the internet to search for a job. Because this variable might proxy
for an overall desire to search within the market (both on and off the job) due to slack
conditions, I will run alternate specifications that restrict the sample to only unemployed
workers, so sm(i) is the proportion of unemployed workers using internet search within a
market.
I will run specifications that aggregate market level variables according to both a
worker’s industry and their occupation in the base year. While this sidesteps the issue of
industry and occupation switching, observed rates of such switches are quite low, especially
for occupation. The level of aggregation will be the 453 four-digit SOC codes for occupation–
from the CPS, standardized to the 2010 codes by IPUMS–and 223 three-digit SIC codes for
industry–standardized to 1990 values again by IPUMS. Below is a sample summary table
of sm(i) as well as market-level control variables for the SOC occupation-based aggregation.
The results of fitting the various specifications are shown in Table 1.4. An m subscript
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Table 1.3: Market Level Variables
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Urate 453 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.08 1.00
Wage 451 926.84 339.43 294.29 657.59 1,131.61 2,020.61
Wage2 451 973,998 723,522 86,606 432,430 1,280,530 4,082,849
N empl. 454 21,123 170,619 45 1,350 10,681 3,402,685
isearch 386 0.68 0.27 0.00 0.54 0.88 1.00
denotes a market level variable. The last four rows denote the effects due to internet search
at the market level, with the last three being the coefficients of interest for search interacted
with low rank. The effect of the level of internet search overall is a negative one; that is,
searchers in markets with high internet search are less likely to exit into unemployment.
This could be due to two possible effects. The first is that it is representing an underlying
level of technical sophistication in the market. Another possibility is that markets with high
internet search are more efficient and workers of high ability are therefore more willing to
stay in unemployment. The fact that the specification for only the unemployed does not
have a significant effect suggests the former explanation (though it could be due to a sample
size effect.)
All three interaction terms for search with ranking variables are positive, with signif-
icance in most specifications. Especially strong is the age interaction effect, which displays
strong significance for every specification. Also suggestive is that the interaction for high
school dropouts is stronger than for those with no college diploma. This implies that the
crowding out effects are most salient for the very lowest-ranked candidates, and the effect
dissipates as one moves up in education levels, as the model predicts. The overall takeaway
is that higher rates of internet job search are associated with higher rates of labor for exit
for only the young and uneducated workers in a market.
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Table 1.4: Logistic Regressions
Dependent variable:
Labor Force Exit
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant −2.381∗∗∗ −0.466∗∗∗ −2.340∗∗∗ −0.331∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.092) (0.052) (0.104)
age −0.012∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.001)
hs dropout 0.564∗∗∗ 0.180∗ 1.015∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.099) (0.050) (0.095)
no college 0.195∗∗∗ 0.113 0.388∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗
(0.039) (0.082) (0.039) (0.080)
male −0.538∗∗∗ −0.409∗∗∗ −0.570∗∗∗ −0.420∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.012) (0.006) (0.012)
white −0.376∗∗∗ −0.184∗∗∗ −0.418∗∗∗ −0.196∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.012)
married −0.189∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.221∗∗∗ −0.005
(0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.011)
Uratem 7.146
∗∗∗ −0.272 7.182∗∗∗ −1.362∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.190) (0.128) (0.231)
Wagem −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.00005) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Wage2m 0.00000
∗∗∗ 0.00000∗∗∗ 0.00000∗∗∗ 0.00000∗∗∗
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
N firmsm 0.00000
∗∗∗ 0.00000∗∗∗ 0.00000∗∗∗ −0.00000∗∗∗
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
isearch −0.812∗∗∗ −0.316 −0.846∗∗∗ −0.107
(0.107) (0.229) (0.113) (0.237)
isearch×(age< 30) 0.575∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗ 0.673∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.054) (0.029) (0.054)
isearch×(hs dropout) 0.447∗∗∗ 0.760∗∗ −0.139 0.667∗∗
(0.166) (0.312) (0.161) (0.297)
isearch×(no college) 0.183 0.378 0.166 0.423∗
(0.124) (0.254) (0.122) (0.248)
Include Employed? Yes No Yes No
Observations 4,407,027 236,758 4,407,110 236,759
Log Likelihood −552,859.900 −112,509.300 −555,249.700 −112,582.100
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,105,750.000 225,048.700 1,110,529.000 225,194.200
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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1.8 Conclusion
This paper constructed a model of simultaneous, random search to study the effects of
cheaper search on employment matching markets.
An environment of endogenous search effort was described that allowed workers to
sample multiple firms and an algorithm describing pairwise stable matching was provided.
Further, the computation of the model equilibrium via pseudospectral element methods
was demonstrated. As the matching algorithm tightens around the locus representing the
vacancy-unemployment ratio, those workers who are the least-preferred lose their incentive
to participate in the matching market as they can no longer “get lucky” and match with a
firm that itself got unlucky.
Given the structure of the matching market, firms and workers make decisions about
their acceptance sets, and firms specifically choose what wage to post. The endogenous wage
distribution thus induced generates increasing wage inequality in response to cheaper search,
as competition for workers generally builds from below and peaks for the highest-ability
workers—put simply, in a high information environment, high-ranked firms know they will
meet a high ranked worker, and they know they will lose that worker to competitors if they
try to post a low wage.
There are several avenues for further research, two of which I will explicitly mention
here. First, the model lacks on the job search. Because close to half of all labor market
transitions involve job-switching, this will be a key element to consider in future work.
An interesting extension of this modeling environment involves both the education
decisions of workers, as well as the job-training behavior of firms. With regard to the former,
if education–which can differentiate a candidate in an absolute sense from another–serves
to move a candidate up the ability ladder, the premium of education should increase. As
for on-the-job training, because firms with more applicants can more readily match with a
better fit, their need to train a worker to a desired level post-hire is lessened. We should
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then expect to see less “skilling up” by workers on the job–an erstwhile valuable source of
education for workers.
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Chapter 2
Labor Reallocation and Sectoral
Shocks
2.1 Introduction
Real business cycle theory relies on the concept of a “shock” to generate fluctuations in an
economy. An example of an aggregate shock is monetary policy—which affects the costs of
borrowing money for every agent in an economy. Sectoral shocks affect predominately the
production in one sector. For example, the shock might be productive like the invention
of a new sector-specific technology, or disruptive, like a spike in the cost of a certain raw
material. The existence of these two kinds of shocks begs the question of which is more
important for the business cycle: do shocks to individual sectors aggregate to drive output
movements; or are these shocks washed out in the aggregate, leaving common shocks as the
only true culprit in business cycle fluctuations? This paper will assess the contribution of
aggregate vs. sectoral shocks by building a real business cycle model calibrated to match
realistic structure in the market for all three major inputs to production: material inputs,
capital goods and labor.
The literature that structurally addresses the contribution of sector-specific vs. ag-
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gregate shocks dates to Long and Plosser (1987), who build a model that incorporates
commodity inputs in production and argue these linkages can generate significant aggre-
gate fluctuations. This literature blossomed with the work of Horvath (2000) and Dupor
(1999), who stake out opposite sides of a debate—with Horvath arguing for the importance
of sectoral shocks under one set of assumptions and Dupor demonstrating their irrelevance
under a different set.
Sector-specific shocks were revisited more recently with Acemoglu et al. (2012), Fo-
erster et al. (2011) (henceforth FSW) and Atalay (2017). The former paper interprets
material purchases between firms as a network. It gives theoretical justification for the
importance of sectoral shocks in the presence of asymmetry in the material network. The
precence of ”star suppliers”—and their higher-order propagating effects—serve to elevate
sectoral shocks to aggregate importance.
Atalay and FSW take a more empirical approach in attempting to estimate precisely
how much aggregate fluctuation is generated by sectoral shocks. FSW employs a structural
model of intersectoral material and capital linkages to filter out their comovement-generating
effects. These shocks are decomposed with factor analytic methods to assess the importance
of sector-specific vs. aggregate shocks. Their findings indicate that prior to the great
moderation (pre-1984), aggregate shocks account for a majority (approx 85%) of output
volatility while sectoral shocks account for roughly half of all volatility after 1984.
Atalay innovates on FSW by incorporating non-unitary elasticities into production.
The paper estimates production elastiticies in materials and final goods that are siginficantly
below 1 by measuring the effect of price movements on input shares. When elasticities are
low—as found in that paper—the role of sectoral shocks is amplified, as firms are less
free to substitute between inputs in the face of disturbances. When realistic elasticities of
substitution are incorporated, sectoral shocks are found to contribute well over half of all
aggregate variation in Atalay’s chosen measure. For the estimated elastiticies in that paper,
almost all volatility is conferred to sectoral shocks. FSW and Atalay are the closest two
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papers to the current one. However, in both of these papers, labor is treated as a stock
variable that is freely recruited in a spot market during every period.
In this paper, I will demonstrate that the re-allocation of labor between sectors occurs
according to a definite network structure: meaning the sector in which a transitioning worker
is located is important for predicting the sector into which they will move. Motivated by
this network structure, I incorporate a Lucas-style frictional labor market into a model with
material and capital linkages as in Atalay. In this model, industries are located on islands,
and workers face an island-dependent probability of successfully transition to another island.
So, for example, the probability that a worker will succeed in an attempted transition
between the “Construction” sector and “Oil and Gas Extraction” is different than between
“Construction” and “Education”. These probabilities allow me to calibrate the model so
that it matches the observed network structure of labor-reallocation.
I find that incorporating a frictional labor market network revises upward the esti-
mate of the contribution of aggregate shocks from the numbers found in Atalay. For most
calibrations, the contribution of these shocks is around 50% of aggregate output volatility,
even with the low production elasiticites found in Atalay. This is due to two potential
effects: a general intertemporal smoothing effect; and an idiosyncratic network effect.
The general effect is that all firms face frictions in adjusting their labor in response
to shocks. The implication for shock propagation is to remove some of the bite of the
material linkages: when a positive shock is propagated to a given sector, that sector faces
an intratemporal labor supply curve that is much steeper than when labor is homogeneous
and allocated within a period in a spot market; conversely, when a negative shock hits,
the effect is somewhat ameliorated by an abundance of cheap labor before workers can
re-allocate.
The network effect works by a similar mechanism, but it greatly reduces the number
of “channels” through which workers can re-allocate, meaning that re-allocation can be
prolonged, inefficient, and might amplify the propagation-numbing effects of frictional labor.
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However, I find that incorporating the network of re-allocation probabilities so as to match
the observed labor re-allocation measure does little to change my estimate of sectoral vs.
aggregate shocks or the comovement of sectoral output. The interpretation is that despite
the structure and sparsity of labor re-allocation between industries, the network is dense
enough to robustly re-allocate workers in a way that does not propagate shocks differently
than a fully connected network.
This paper also relates to a large literature on sectoral labor reallocation. Dvorkin
(2013) incorporates a Lucas island model into a real business cycle model with material
linkages and finds that labor frictions are important for the co-movement of business cycle
variables. Pilossoph (2014) builds a similar model to demonstrate that intersectoral labor
frictions do not generate large levels of unemployment in a two-sector setting. The current
paper similarly finds that the structure in which cyclical upgrading occurs is relatively
unimportant for the propagation of sectoral shocks; but that general frictions to re-allocation
do have large implications for the source of business cycle fluctuations.
2.2 Data
This section details the various data sources that will be used in either calibrating the
model or as the productivity series from whence the underlying disturbances are filtered.
The first source of data is sectoral output data from the BEA, which will be the observable
quantity used to assess industry-level production. The next three data sources will each
be used to respectively calibrate one of the three main inputs to production in the model.
The first is the input-output architecture of materials from BEA’s Use table. The Capital
Flows table—also from the BEA—will inform the structure of capital purchases. Lastly,
the network structure of intersectoral labor mobility will be assessed via the CPS microdata
provided by the IPUMS project at the University of Minnesota. This latter data source
will be novel to this paper, while the previous will closely follow the methodology of the
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aforementioned literature.
2.2.1 Sectoral Output
The BEA publishes yearly series on gross output by industry for up to 71 different industries
at roughly three-digit NAICS disaggregation from 1997-2016. These series represent the
total output in producer prices of a particular industry in a given year. (Note that this
differs from GDP which would subtract value of intermediate inputs.)
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the growth rates of the output series. Weighted-
average standard deviation of the growth rate is 2.7 percentage points while the average
pairwise correlation between growth rates, ρ¯(yi, yj), is 0.143. The former value is slightly
lower and the latter slightly higher than that reported in FSW, likely because they are using
quarterly IP data while my series are yearly output.
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for Sectoral Output
Avg. Std Dev. Avg. Cross-Correlation
2.7 0.143
The average correlation coefficient of the series is an important statistic for the analy-
sis of output movement carried out in this paper. The estimation techniques to decompose
volatility onto aggregate and sectoral sources will employ a structural, calibrated model to
incorporate the effects of linkages within the economy. Examining whether the resultant
model-generated cross-correlations are similar to the data will be important for determin-
ing whether it is accurately capturing the propagatory effects of linkages. In the results
section this statistic will serve as a benchmark target to assess the fit of the different model
calibrations.
The distribution of cross-correlation coefficients between output series is plotted in
Figure 1. This distribution is visibly normal with a reasonably large standard deviation
of 0.31. So while on average sectors are correlated, not all sectors are, nor is it a small
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number of highly correlated sectors that is driving up the average. The large standard
deviation already suggests that sectoral shocks are active—if only aggregate shocks were
important, one would likely think that output correlation coefficients would be both high
and concentrated.
Figure 2.1: Distribution of Output Cross-Correlations
2.2.2 IO Architecture
The levels at which sectors purchase materials from each other is recorded in the BEA’s Use
table. A typical entry in this table gives the total amount spent in producer’s prices by any
given sector on another sector’s output (as intput into their own production). The material
use table induces a weighted, directed network ΦM = (N, εM ) where the N nodes are the
economy sectors and the strength of the edges are the share of sector j’s total purchases
obtained from sector i.
As stated in the introduction, the material network represented by the Use Table will
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be key in calibrating the material requirements of firms within the model economy. The
entries within the table give the long-run, steady-state average share of one sector’s material
goods in the production of another sector’s and will therefore serve as the calibration target
for this share in the model analog.
Figure 1 plots the histogram of the degree distribution of the material network. An
edge is said to “exist” in this image if sector i provides more than 5% of sector j’s out of
sector purchases. The strong right-skew of the histogram portrays the presence of “star
suppliers”—sectors which supply heavily to many others—which are shown in Acemoglu
et al. (2012) theoretically and Foerster et al. (2011) empirically to be important in the
amplification of sectoral shocks.
Figure 2.2: Distribution of Normalized Outdegrees for Material Network
2.2.3 Capital Flows
The Capital Flows table is the analog of the Use table for Capital goods and shows the
purchases made by sectors on capital goods from other sectors. The right skewed nature
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of the degree distribution is even more pronounced in the capital flow table—most sectors
provide 0 in capital goods, while Construction provides nearly 40% of the total.
2.2.4 Intersectoral Labor Movement
Material and capital goods s aren’t the only things that flow between sectors. Workers as
well reallocate between sectors as those sectors’ ouput fluctuates. However, an analog of
the IO table from the BEA does not exist for worker flows—that is, no table exists with
the flows of workers from one sector to another.
This is potentially an important omission in any use of structural estimation that em-
ploys a multi-sector model. Take the example of a single sector propagating an experienced
shock to the rest of the economy. The intuition is that if sector i experiences a positive
shock, they will be able to increase their productive efficiency, hence making their goods
cheaper. Since these goods are used as material inputs by other sectors, the shock will
propagate in the form of cheaper materials to those sectors who buy from sector i. In this
story, the extent to which sector i can capitalize on its positive shock is key to the quantity
of gains it can realize and therefore pass on to its connected sectors.
However, a firm’s ability to capitalize on a positive shock is affected by the kind
of labor market it faces. When labor is purchased in an aggregate spot-market at an
aggregate wage, individual sectors face a relatively flat labor-supply curve: unless the sector
is very large, they can expect to be able to hire freely without much effect on the overall
wage. However, if the sector faces frictions to increasing their labor supply—either generally
through search frictions or because of a restriction in the pool of viable workers—the supply
curve they face will be steeper and larger, idiosyncratic wage movements would be required.
Therefore, because the possibility of labor frictions have implications for the propagation
of shocks, it is important to asses whether frictions of this kind are present; and if so,
incorporate them into the structural model used to filter the output data.
To accomplish the former, I consult the CPS microdata, obtained from the IPUMS
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database hosted at The University of Minnnesota. These data contain overlapping cohorts
of approximately 50,000 individuals each of which questions are asked about the industry
in which a respondent currently works. The structure of interviews involves two, segregated
four-month panels: four months on; eight months off; then four months on again. I exploit
this limited panel dimension to build an N × N matrix R of observed month-to-month
intersectoral worker transitions over the same period of time as the output series, 1997-
2016. Any entry in the matrix rij , shows the total number of transitions over the sample
from sector i to sector j.
As identified in Hagedorn et al. (2017), the CPS microdata can often overstate in-
dustry switches due to noisy reporting. To combat this problem I employ the strategies
suggested in Moscarini and Thomsson (2006)—namely, using a monthly rather than yearly
timeframe, and using an algorithm to throw out likely spurious transitions. The following
section details this filtering algorithm.
2.2.4.1 The Cleaning Algorithm
Moscarini and Thomsson (2006) constructed a filter that allowed them to discard likely
spurious observations of occupational switches. I will consider a similar algorithm that
discards spurious industry switches.
This begins by only considering data from 1994-2015. In 1994, the CPS began a new
survey method for industry and occupation classification called “back-coding” that relies on
asking if a worker is in the same job, rather than asking for independent job-characteristics
every survey. This drastically reduces the number of observed (and likely erroneous) transi-
tions over the pre-1994 to post-1994 samples. Additionally, I will be considering output data
over the 1994-2015 period, so the 1994-2015 sample avoids any consistency issues related to
changing patterns of labor mobility.
Another important issue to address with the CPS is that their sampling is based on
fixed addresses, not households. IPUMS already matches households and individuals over
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time, meaning I do not have to worry about this issue. Though, if using raw CPS data I
would have to account for changing household number—HHNUM.
With those preliminaries out of the way, the first level of the industry filter considers
several variables that immediately signal a suspicious transition. These variables are AGE,
SEX, and RACE. Clearly any of these changing over the sample (or in the case of AGE,
changing by more than one year) indicates a highly suspicious sampling (the respondent
has likely changed,) and so any industry switch thus observed must be discarded.
The second layer of the filter considers survey variables that are found to be highly
correlated with occupation switches in Moscarini and Thomsson (2006), meaning that any
transition without the accompanying correlates is considered suspicious. These variables
are: EMPSAME—“Do you work for the same employer as last month?”; CLASSWKR—the
class, e.g. public or private, of the worker’s employing firm; and OCC1990—the occupation
of the worker in the 1990 census classification. I employ an ANY3 method, whereby if
none of the three correlated variables are of the correct value then the observed transition
is thrown out. Precisely, if the data indicate an industry transition but 1) the occupation
remains the same and 2) the worker is still working for the same firm and 3) the class of the
worker remains the same I consider the transition spurious and remove it from the sample.
Lastly, I throw out the entire series for any individual who reports more than three
total switches over the eight-month sample. This is a slightly different and perhaps some-
what stricter discriminant that Moscarini and Thomsson (2006) who only consider the first
four-month sample for every individual, and therein allow certain samples with three total
transitions but never four total.
After cleaning, I am left with 466,825 total industry switches. When standardizing
all data sets to N = 57 sectors, this implies an average of 146.25 observations of switching
per possible combination—representing good coverage. The average number of industry
switches observed in a month—that is, the sum of off-diagonal elements over the total—
is 3.4%, close to the number found in Moscarini and Thomsson (2006) for occupational
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switchers.
2.2.5 The Structure of Re-allocation
A natural question is whether the movement of workers between sectors is reasonably ran-
dom, or whether it follows a definite pattern. A random realloaction of workers would imply
that the probability of observing a worker move from sector i to sector j is given by the
product of their sizes: lilj where li is the share of total workers employed in sector i. This
is a simple multinomial model, and mimics the Balls and Bins model of Trade of Armenter
and Koren (2014). To test the hypothesis of a multinomial model of random reallocation,
for sector i let Nri be the total number of workers transfering out of it in the sample.
Then let eij = Nri
lj∑
k 6=i lk
be the expected number of transitions between i and j under the
multinomial model. The following statistic can then be computed:
Ri =
∑
j 6=i
(rij − eij)2/eij ∼ χ2N−1
where rij is the observed number of transitions between i and j.
The logs of these statistics, which are distributed chi-squared with N-1 degrees of
freedom, are plotted in Figure 2, along with the cutoff for rejection at the α = 0.01 level.
As is clear from the picture, for every sector in the sample, the null hypothesis of random
re-allocation between sectors is rejected at the 1% level. The rejection also appears to be
stronger for manufacturing sectors, with an average value of 65,370 vs. 30,691 for non-
manufacturing sectors. This suggests that there is more explicit structure underlying the
transition of employees between manufacturing sectors—an interesting topic for future work.
The results of the multinomial test show that sectoral re-allocation of labor contains a
great deal of non-random structure. Because labor is an important input to production for
virtually every sector, any model of a multisector economy—especially one that purports to
filter out sectoral shocks from observable output data—should take account of this structure
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Figure 2.3: Log Test Stat for Worker Reallocation
of re-allocation if it intends to have accurate properties.
The argument against previous models of sectoral shocks with flexible labor markets
is similar to any model of flexible labor—firms must engage in time- and resource-consuming
effort to match with workers and utilize their labor effectively. In the next section I endeavor
to build a multisectoral model of the economy that can, in fact, account for this kind of
frictional labor market and match its observables in the data. Along other dimensions, it
will attempt to cater as closely as possible to previous literature so as to serve an accurate
comparison.
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2.3 Model
This section will construct a multi-sector model of an economy that can incorporate the
features highlighted in the previous section. While the machinery used for the capital and
material linkages will be similar to that seen in previous work, the movement of workers
between sectors will be modeled according to a Lucas-Island style model where workers
face probabilities of successfully transitioning between certain sectors. This will later be
calibrated to match the observed transitions of workers from the CPS microdata.
2.3.1 Firms
Firms within the model will produce within an industry and each industry will operate as
though with a representative firm. The output of a given industry can be used as material
and capital inputs within their production according to a fixed technology that they own.
Labor is recruited from within the island’s labor pool at the prevailing island wage which
is determined in equilibrium.
2.3.1.1 Final Goods
The economy is composed of N industries that can be interpreted as islands. Each industry
j has a positive measure of firms who have access to a constant returns to scale, CES
technology fj : R3+ → R+ that maps labor, capital and material bundles into output
according to:
fj(`jt, kjt,Mjt) = yjt = Ajt
[

1−ψy
j `
ψy
jt + τ
1−ψy
j M
ψy
jt + α
1−ψy
j k
ψy
jt
]1/ψy
where Ωy =
1
1−ψy governs the elasticity of substitution of final good production and the
input weights are restricted such that 
1/ΩY
j + τ
1/ΩY
j +α
1/ΩY
j = 1∀ j. Ajt is a factor-neutral
61
technology which is modeled as a vector martingale process:
At+1 −At = εt+1 ∼ N(0,Σε)
2.3.1.2 Inputs
The material bundle is created with material purchases from all other sectors according to
a sector-specific technology:
Mjt =
N∑
i=1
[
γ1−ψmij m
ψm
ijt
]1/ψm
which is again CES in nature. mijt represents time t purchases of materials from sector i
by sector j, while the matrix Γ with element γij describes the importance of industries as
producers for each other. The columns of Γ1−ψm are restricted to sum to 1.
I do not place any restriction or cost on the trade of islands with each other and allow
material trade to occur simultaneously within a period. This contrasts with the setup of
Long and Plosser (1983) who incorporate a one-period lag in material delivery (see FSW
for a comparison between models).
Capital goods are a stock owned by firms which evolves according to kjt+1 = (1 −
δ)kjt + zjt where
zjt =
N∑
i=1
[
ρ1−ψkij x
ψk
ijt
]1/ψk
is investment in new capital. Like materials, investment is an aggregate of purchases from
other sectors with the matrix P describing the input weights.
Note that for both capital and material goods, well-known aggregation results will
imply that it does not matter who owns their production technology. I will interpret these
input technologies as belonging to the final goods firms; though they could alternatively be
thought of as separate firms operating in a Walrasian market with prices for their respective
bundles.
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Labor is recruited in a spot market from the stock of workers on an island. Let njt
be the population of an island and Ljt labor per worker, then
`jt = njtLjt
The population on an island is fixed within a period. This implies that firms are only capable
of increasing labor input on the intensive margin within the period. Any adjustment of labor
on the extensive margin must come about through increasing the population of an island
in future periods.
2.3.1.3 Prices
Market equilibrium will obtain under a list of prices taken as given by the agents: prices
of each sector’s final good, pjt; wage in each sector wjt; price of the material bundle in
each sector pMjt; and the price of the consumption aggregate which will be assigned as the
numeraire Pt = 1.
2.3.1.4 Decision Problem
The problem of a profit-maximizing final-goods firm in sector j amounts to:
max
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
pjtyjt − wjt`jt − pMjtMjt −
N∑
i=1
pitxijt
]
s.t.
yjt = Ajt
[

1−ψy
j `
ψy
jt + τ
1−ψy
j M
ψy
jt + α
1−ψy
j k
ψy
jt
]1/ψy
Mjt =
N∑
i=1
[
γ1−ψmij m
ψm
ijt
]1/ψm
kjt+1 = (1− δ)kjt +
N∑
i=1
[
ρ1−ψkij x
ψk
ijt
]1/ψk
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taking as given all spot prices. The aggregate state St = {sit}N1 is made up of the industry
state sjt = (njt, kjt, Ajt) of every island. This state is mapped into the next period according
to the law of motion St+1 = Φ (St).
2.3.2 Workers
In addition to a measure of firms, each island in a period has a population njt of workers who
can sell their labor to firms in spot markets. These workers derive flow utility Ujt = U(Cjt)
from consuming a CES aggregate of consumption goods that is bundled and sold by a
positive measure of perfectly competitive firms:
Ct =
N∑
i=1
[
ω1−ψdi c
ψd
it
]1/ψd
where ψd is the elasticity of substitution between consumption goods in the consumption
basket and ω determines the relative importance of the sectors’ goods for consumption.
Workers also experience disutility of labor according to ΩLΩL+1L
ΩL+1
ΩL
In each period, workers can attempt to switch sectors for the start of the next period.
Each worker k receives a vector of idiosyncratic taste shocks ekt = {ek1t, ..., ekNt} for the
other sectors. They further face a probability piij of successfully making the transition
between any two sectors i and j. The matrix Π contains these probabilities and is fixed.
Workers then choose in which sector they will search for the period (including own).
The matrix Π is intended to help the model match the observable facets of the labor
market observed in section two; namely, that the movement of workers between sectors is
highly structured. I do not impose a strong interpretation on the values of piij , and will
instead solely use them to attempt to match observable intersectoral flows between industry
pairs. Their real-world referent could be either an observed probability of successfully
finding a job in the new sector (perceived fit) or the probability of making contact with a
firm from the new sector (informational). With the data I have it is impossible to identify
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between these two stories.
2.3.2.1 Decision Problem
The worker m in sector j observes the aggregate state, St as well as prices and its idiosyn-
cratic profile of taste shocks, and chooses how much labor to sell, its volume of consumption
bundles, and where to search during the period. Workers cannot save. Their bellman equa-
tion is then
Vmj(St) = max{Cmjt,Lmjt,k}
{U(Cmjt, Lmjt)
+βE [Vmj(St+1) + pijk (Vmk(St+1)− Vmj(St+1)) + emkt]}
s.t. Cmjt ≤ wjtLmjt
This value function is standard apart from the search choice. The worker takes into
account the probability pijk of successfully transitioning into any of the other sectors from
her current sector. So while a particular sector may have a particularly high expected
value when on the island, Vmkt+1, it can be heavily discounted if the worker perceives a low
probability of successfully transitioning. A worker in retail trade might love to get a job
in the oil and gas extraction sector because of the concomitant high wages; however, they
know that they are unlikely to succeed in this transition and will likely forego attempting
it for more realistic options.
2.3.2.2 Aggregate Worker Flows
If one assumes that the taste shocks emkt are independently distributed according to a type
I extreme value distribution (log-weibull) with variance ρ, and location parameter set to 0,
then they can be integrated out to find a worker’s transition probabilities between sectors.
The probability of a worker in period t transitioning from sector i to sector j 6= i ex ante
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taste shocks is given by
θijt = piij
exp{piijρ Dijt}∑N
k=1 exp{piikρ Dikt}
where Dijt = E [Vj(St+1)− Vi(St+1)] is the expected gain of a successful transition. This is
the well-known result from McFadden (1977) regarding discrete choice under Type I extreme
value. The probability of transition between sectors for a given worker is an evaluation of the
expected gains from such an attempt, relative to all other sectoral choices. This probability
is made noisy by the parameter ρ, such that in the limit ρ → ∞, the transition attempts
are pure noise and the worker is equally likely to apply to any sector; and when ρ → 0,
a series of probability-augmented “no-arbitrage” conditions emerge to force the expected
gains of a transition to 0. This limit is similar to the well-known Lucas island model with
the transition probabilities being the only difference.
The parameter ρ can roughly be thought of as controlling how much sector-level
wage/value differences direct the transitions in the labor market. However, it is important
in another regard when it comes to fitting the data. Wage profiles within an industry are
clearly not point masses, meaning that a given industry will have wage heterogeneity within
it. ρ helps to capture this effect and could be thought of as representing variation in wage
offers within the same sector. ρ also helps to reproduce the well known result in sectoral
labor models that gross flows are much larger than net flows. This bespeaks a large amount
of informational and wage variation in the labor market that is not captured by sectoral
aggregates.
Once the taste shocks are integrated out in a worker’s decision problem, an industry’s
population measure can now be modeled by a representative consumer with value function
Vj(St) = max{Cjt,Ljt}
{
U(Cjt, Ljt) + E
[∑
i
θjitVi(St+1)
]}
where θjjt = 1 −
∑
i 6=j θjit. The model can now be solved without regard to idiosyncratic
taste shocks.
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The matrix of transition probabilities Θt describe a state-dependent first-order markov
process for the labor flows between sectors. As such, the law of motion for island population
can be written in vector form as:
nt+1 = Θ
′
tnt
2.4 System Reduction and Approximation
The state space of the model becomes very large even for a small number of sectors. The
minimal state space contains the capital stock kjt, island population hjt, and the produc-
tivity level Ajt for every sector in the economy. With N = 57 sectors this results in 171
state variables, all but requiring first-order perturbation methods.
Perturbation methods approximate the equilibrium behavior of a model by approxi-
mating its equations around a chosen point—typically the steady state of the model. First-
order perturbation has some undesirable effects, most notably, it cannot capture curvature
and therefore risk aversion of agents. However, this model is not meant to capture any
realistic behavior related to risk aversion; indeed, there is no saving and households face
risk only at the industry and aggregate level.
Even using perturbation methods, the model needs to be reduced to the minimal
number of equations possible for reasonable computational speed. This section will perform
such a “system reduction” to reduce the full set of model equations to a set of 4N dynamic
equations in 4N unknowns—nt, kt, Vt, pt.
2.4.1 Blanchard Kahn and Approximation
Equations x-y give a system of 4N equations in 4N unknowns in the familiar form for solving
linear rational expectations models via the standard toolkits:
Ayt+1 = Byt + ΦAt
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however, the model is under-identified at this point due to the normalization of the nu-
meraire price Pt = 1 ∀t. Therefore I use the system reduction algorithm outlined in King
and Watson (1998) to account for static equations not readily apparent from the dynamic
system. The first-order system is then solved using the standard King and Watson algo-
rithm.
2.5 The Model Filter
Let st = (nt, kt) be the minimal endogenous state used to execute the state-filtering algo-
rithm. One can use the decision rules from the model approximation to filter the from the
data the implied endogenous states and the exogenous series of exogenous shocks εt. To that
end, the model solution gives us the following linear state space model with measurement
and state evolution equation:
yt = ΠaAt + Πsst
st+1 = Msst +MaAt
Πa is invertible, allowing us to find an expression for the productivity series:
At = Π
−1
a [yt + Πsst]
Given the martingale assumption on At, we can then difference both of these equations
to obtain
εt = Π
−1
a [∆yt + Πs∆st]
∆st+1 = Ms∆st +Maεt
From this system, one can then extract the model-implied disturbances from the
observable output time series. Initializing ∆s0 = ε0 = 0 to allows to iterate forward and
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filter the shocks εt for the duration of the output time series.
2.6 Factor Analysis
Once the implied sector disturbances are in hand, we can then estimate a common factor
model to assess the relative contribution of sectoral vs. aggregate shocks. The productivity
disturbances will by assumption be generated by the following common factor model:
εt = ΛFt + ut ut ∼ N(0, σ2uIN )
This common factor model posits the existence of sectoral vs. aggregate shocks. Every firm’s
productivity process is the combination of a common component—Ft with concomitant
factor loadings λj for sector j—and an idiosyncratic component given by ujt. As is typical
in factor models, the covariance matrix of the idiosyncratic component is assumed to be
diagonal.
Principal components can be used to consistently estimate the factors Ft, given the
extracted series {εt}. While it is possible to use model-validation techniques to choose the
number of common factors when estimating a common factor model, I will follow FSW and
Atalay and estimate a two-factor model to ensure comparability to those papers. Mapping
the extracted factor component ΛFˆt and sector-specific component uˆt back into the observ-
able output series yˆt over a large impulse response horizon gives an estimated covariance
decomposition of Σˆyy onto aggregate and sectoral components respectively.
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Now, recall the state space structure of the model:
∆yt = Πs∆st + Πaεt
∆st+1 = Ms∆st +Maεt
⇒
∆yt = Πaεt + Πs
∞∑
i=0
M isMaεt−i−1
where the matrix power i means repeated matrix multiplication. A sufficiently large window
of past shocks can then be used to assess the effect of shocks on output. Taking the variance
of this expression then yields
Σyy = ΠaΣεΠ
′
a + Πs
( ∞∑
i=1
M isMaΣεM
′
a(M
i
s)
′
)
Π′s
After imposing the factor structure on the covariance matrix of the disturbances, one can
now use the decomposition of Σε with this impulse response representation to calculate
R2(F ):
Σyy =ΠaΛΣFΛ
′Π′a + Πs
( ∞∑
i=1
M isMaΛΣFΛ
′M ′a(M
i
s)
′
)
Π′s
+ σ2u
[
ΠaΠ
′
a + Πs
( ∞∑
i=1
M isMaM
′
a(M
i
s)
′
)
Π′s
]
. This format gives the full decomposition of output variance into common and idiosyncratic
components. The estimated factor and idiosyncratic model parameters can then be for the
estimation procedure.
2.7 Calibration
The model’s parameters need values assigned before its filter can be taken to the data.
Several parameters are standard can be taken from the literature. β is set to 0.96 to
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correspond with the yearly frequency of the output time series. The depreciation rate δ is
set to 0.1. L¯ is normalized to 1. ΩL—the elasticity of labor supply—is also normalized to
1 as σ will control the elasticity of labor, which is set to 0.7 to match a Frisch elasticity of
0.4.
The remainder of the parameters require some care in their calibration strategy. One
goal of this section is to provide some historical comparability between the results in FSW,
Atalay and this paper. Therefore, I will estimate four different calibrations of the model:
one for each of the previous papers and two new strategies for the current one. The intent
will be to progressively introduce new channels into the theoretical framework and assess
their relative contribution as well as to bridge the gaps between former work. I will refer to
the FSW and Atalay calibrations as MFSW and MAtalay respectively.
The calibrations of FSW and Atalay differ mainly in their targets for the production
elasticities: Ωy, Ωd, Ωm and Ωk. FSW somewhat agnostically uses unitary elasticities at all
levels of production, in the absence of any data on the responses of firms to prices. Atalay,
by contrast, attempts to directly estimate these elasticities using an instrumental variables
approach. That paper finds vastly lower elasticities of substitution than unitary especially
for the material elasticity, Ωm which is estimated at close to 0. For Atalay’s calibration I
will use Ωy = 0.5, Ωm = 0.1, and Ωd = Ωk = 1.
Several share parameters in the model need to be calibrated. Γ and P will be cal-
ibrated to match the expenditure share of sectors upon each others’ goods in both the
material bundle and the investment bundles respectively from the Use table and Capital
Flows table. α, τ and  will be calibrated to match the income/expenditure share of each
sector on investment, material purchases, and wage payments respectively relative to total
input purchases—this information is also available in data from the BEA.
Another key difference is present in the calibrations of FSW and Atalay, regarding the
importance of capital in production: α. The chosen calibration target for the expenditure
share of capital in FSW is total value added, meaning that it includes profit (or returns to
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investors), while the latter paper takes only purchase value of new capital expenditures as
the data analog. Profits to firms should be considered part of income accruing to capital;
however, including this when calibrating is somewhat contrary to the nature of α in the
model. α represents the importance of the concrete capital goods purchased from other
sectors. Increasing α by including returns to investors overstates the importance of these
production inputs in the production function. Because neither interpretation is obviously
correct, and to improve comparability with both papers, I include calibrations with both
statistics.
The probabilities of successful movement between sectors, stored in the matrix Π will
be calibrated to match the observed movement between sectors in steady state. Because the
observable output series are at a yearly frequency, the Markov transition matrix of observed
transition proportions from the data (which are monthly) must be multiplied out for twelve
periods.
In order to assess the relative contribution of the general friction to switching sectors
(workers cannot reallocate freely within a period and must wait one period no matter
their target sector) and the network frictions where workers face probabilities of successful
transition, I will include two calibrations. In the first, the network frictions to switching
sectors are shut down, that is, piij = 1 for all sectors. Call this calibration Mopen. The
second calibration is the full model with the piij calibrated to match observed transitions.
Call this model Mind
2.8 Results
In order to contextualize the results of the model, I will compare the relevant statistics to
calibrations of the model that conform to past exercises in the literature—namely, FSW
and Atalay. Both of these models involve shutting down frictional labor—meaning that
labor is hired in an aggregate spot market at a single wage each period. (See either of these
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papers for details). The two models differ from each other in their production elastiticities,
as detailed in the Calibration section.
It should also be noted that Atalay presents a different set of statistics than those
presented here and in FSW. In that paper and this one, sectoral shocks are mapped, via
the model filter, back to observables, and statistics are reported for those values. Atalay
reports the statistics only for the underlying shocks and not the residuals. Here I have
reported the statistics for the Atalay calibration as those for the observables, which might
explain some discrepancies.
Table 7 presents several statistics for the model-based output growth rates under
several calibrations and the FSW and Atalay benchmarks. The first statistic—R2(F ) is the
proportion of aggregate, observable output volatility that is attributable to common factors.
This is the statistic reported in FSW, and I follow them in allowing for two underlying
common shocks. Note that Atalay performs his analysis using one underlying factor. This
naturally adjusts R2(F ) downward as fewer underlying factors are allowed to account for
the variation in the time series. However, the results seem to be relatively robust to upward
adjustments in the number of factors above two (as found in FSW).
The first comparison to note is that of MFSW vs. MAtalay. The difference in these
two models is the reduction in the elasticity of inputs for final goods and material bundles
from 1 to 0.5 and 0.1 respectively. The statistics for both models accord broadly with those
found in their papers. Note, however, that the choice of calibrating data statistic for capital
shares is important for all three reported statistics.
The results for contribution of aggregate shocks in both these models are similar to
those reported in Atalay. For that model, the statistics for both correlation of sectoral
output and volatility of aggregate output are both much larger than found in the data. Ap-
parently, the model is generating output that is too correlated relative to data, and therefore
overall volatility is too high (overall variance being the weighted sum of all variances and
covariances). This presents a puzzle—given the estimation of Ωy and Ωm in Atalay—one
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that will be partially resolved by incorporating realistic labor frictions.
Comparing the Matalay model with the Mopen model, we see that incorporating labor
as a state variable with island frictions revises upward the estimate of the contribution of
sectoral shocks. The MAtalay calibration estimates a contribution of common shocks of 0.04
and 0.21 for the two capital calibrations. For the Mopen model, this statistic is revised
upward to 0.32 and 0.46. This change reflects the inability of firms to adjust their labor
supply as flexibly in a Lucas-type model.
The average correlation of output growth is lowered considerably by incorporating
island frictions. This is due to the differences in the way labor is recruited between the
models. When labor is perfectly flexible, there is a single wage determined throughout
the whole economy, and firms are free to hire as much or as little as they prefer at that
wage. In the island model, firms are stuck with their island population in the short term.
This means that a sector that would like to increase production in good times is hobbled
by a rapidly increasing wage as any increase in labor at the sectoral level must occur on
the intensive margin. Obversely, when times are bad, a larger than needed population of
workers remain on the island, implying that labor is cheaper than it once was, offsetting
the decreased productivity. Overall this effect serves to hobble the propagation of sectoral
shocks through the material network, especially in the case of low elasticities.
Moving right on the table, the next comparison is between the open island model and
the Mind model, where worker transition probabilities between sectors are calibrated to
match observed transitions. Surprisingly, incorporating realistic transition probabilites does
little to change the chosen statistics to the model—all three remain virtually unchanged.
This suggests that the labor market is relatively robust in apportioning labor, despite the
observed sparsity in pairwise flows. Several papers have suggested a ”mismatch” theory
of unemployment; it appears that, at least as it applies to sector-specific skills and re-
allocation, mismatch is not a large determinant of labor market inefficiency.
Perhaps the best way to couch this latter result and to provide a window into further
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Table 2.2: Model Comparison
Calibration R2(F ) ρ¯ σ¯g
MFSW
Cap Expend. 0.49 0.17 3.51
Value Add 0.77 0.22 3.57
MAtalay
Cap Expend. 0.04 0.59 10.18
Value Add 0.21 0.45 6.02
MOpen
Cap Expend. 0.32 0.37 4.58
Value Add 0.46 0.31 3.89
MInd
Cap Expend. 0.32 0.38 4.62
Value Add 0.46 0.31 3.90
Data
- - 0.143 2.7
work is to consider the model as solved by the social planner. Given the lack of externalities
in the model, the social planner’s solution will match the competitive equilibrium. It is not
hard to imagine that, even on a very sparse network of labor reallocation, a social planner
would be adept at correctly apportioning labor reallocation along network links. It remains
interesting that the network is robust despite its sparsity however. It would be interesting
to consider an environment without such strong coordinating features, however; perhaps
with a lag in information updating by firms and/or workers.
2.9 Conclusion
This paper incorporated realistic stucture for all three production inputs in a multisectoral
real business cycle model in order to estimate the contribution of aggregate vs. sectoral
shocks. In so doing, it documented the structure of sectoral labor reallocation and calibrated
a structural model to match the features of that structure. The structural model generated
a filter that was used to estimate the contribution of the two different sources of disturbances
from sectoral output data in the US economy.
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Approximately half of aggregate volatility is due to sectoral disturbances—a higher
number than in past literature. The mechanism responsible for the revised estimate vis a
vis past literature is a general sluggishness in the adjustment of labor and not the particular
structure of sectoral labor reallocation—which is largely irrelevant when general frictions
are incorporated.
Future research could advance in several directions. Realistic unemployment is absent
from the model, and workers would make different re-allocation decisions based on whether
they were unemployed or not. Second, the model above imposes the same elasticities in
production for all industries. This is partially due to paucity of data; but there might be
some value to attempting to estimate different elasticities for different industries, given how
much these elasticities can change the main results.
Appendix A: Model Approximation
The key first order conditions from the firms’ and consumers’ decision problems are:
wjt = pjt
(
(1− τj)yjt
`jt
) 1
Ωy
PMjt = pjt
(
τj
yjt
Mjt
) 1
Ωy
pit = PMjt
(
γij
Mjt
mijt
) 1
Ωm
cjt = p
−Ωd
jy ωjCt
1
Cjt
=
L
1/ΩL
jt
wjt
µjt = pjt+1
[
αj
yjt+1
kjt+1
] 1
ΩY
+ β(1− δ)µjt+1
Firm Equations
I will begin the log-linearization and system reduction at the firm’s supply equations. In
the following sections a tilde above a variable denotes percent deviation from steady state.
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Variables without industry subscripts e.g. yt are understood to be the vector of industry
variables (y1t, ..., yNt)
First, let Xl = 1 + ΩY
(
σ + 1ΩL
)
/(1 − σ) represent the wage-labor tradeoff. And ξl,
ξk, and ξn represent the steady state marginal products of the material bundle, capital and
labor respectively. Substituting the optimal policy for the material bundle into the supply
equation yields:
Πyyy˜t = ΠyaA˜t + Πypp˜t + Πykk˜t + Πynn˜t
where
Πya =diag((1− τξ1−Ωyl )−1)
Πyp =diag((1− τξ1−Ωyl )−1)
Πyk =diag((1− τξ1−Ωyl )−1αξ1−Ωyk ))
Πyn =diag((1− τξ1−Ωyl )−1(Xl − 1)ξ1−Ωyn /Xl))
Then, the supply equation of firms can be written as
Syyy˜t = Sypp˜t + Sykk˜t + Syk1k˜t+1
Substituting for y˜t from the above equation yields the capital accumulation equation.
Euler Equations
Letting ∆pz = diag(p
Ωm−1
Mss )
[
Γdiag(p1−ΩMss )
]′
, and substituting for y˜t+1 from the supply
equation, we can get
Γpp˜t = ΓaA˜t+1 + Γkk˜t+1 + Γnn˜t+1 + Γp1p˜t+1
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Labor Dynamics
From the state-dependent law of motion of island population equations, we can get
θ˜t = TV V˜t + Tnn˜t
where θ˜t = (θ˜11t, θ˜12t, ..., θ˜1Nt, θ˜21t, ...θ˜NNt)t with appropriate Log-linearized coeffi-
cients.
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Chapter 3
Product Search, Markups and
Variety
3.1 Introduction
At the turn of the 20th century, coal mining towns throughout the United States would
often feature a company store. In the folk imagination, these stores were notorious for poor
selection, high prices and indebted patrons. However, once automobile use became main-
stream and coal miners could go to town to shop, the company store quickly disappeared.
The company store is a symbol for how search-constrained shoppers allow the existence
of high prices and poor variety-selection. Its disappearance suggests that, as new search
technology becomes available to consumers, the pricing and establishment allocations of an
economy are forced to change as well.
The ability of consumers to view prices is currently undergoing a new transition.
Figure 3.1 shows the percentage of all retail sales that occur online in terms of dollars sold.
Starting under 1% in 2000 it is now set to surpass 9% in 2017, with 80% of all US adults
now shopping online in some form or another. Evidently, shoppers are seeing an increasing
ability to quickly and efficiently compare goods on price and quality and make the purchase
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Figure 3.1: Ecommerce
that is best for them.
One of the most thought-provoking questions to emerge in the face of online retail and
the search technology it offers consumers is “How will prices be affected?” Straightforward
intuition suggests that as consumers are better able to sample prices and choose the lowest
cost good, prices should go down in response to online search. However, Ellison and Ellison
(2018) show that online prices are actually higher in the market for used books—the more
so the more special interest the title.
This paper shows that both outcomes—rising or falling prices–can be consistent with
online search within a competitive general equilibrium. The key feature of products that
determines the response of their prices to search is how consumers’ tastes are distributed.
If a product is relatively generic, meaning that consumers’ valuations are clustered tightly
around the mean, then prices will decline with search as firms compete more strongly.
However, if the taste distribution is highly right-tailed—corresponding to very specialized
interests over the goods—then increasing search will cause firms to focus their pricing strat-
egy on a small subset of consumers that value them highly. This is exactly the outcome
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observed in Ellison and Ellison (2018)—where a highly specialized product goes from being
sold to a large mass of relatively uncaring consumers to one where it is priced for a small
number of consumers who value it highly. This paper provides an exact characterization
in terms of the taste distribution of when prices will increase or decrease with respect to
search.
Concurrent with the persistent increase in online sales has been an emergent con-
centration of production in smaller numbers of firms. Figure 3.1 displays the number of
employees per firm from data gathered by the Statistics of US Businesses dataset provided
by the BEA. Firms are evidently facing strong impulses to concentrate production, and
I document in this paper that an increase in consumer search behavior can explain this
result. This effect will come about predominantly through downward pressure on prices,
and is likely to affect industries with more generic products strongly. Indeed, according to
the model, more specialized products like used books should see an increase in the number
of producers as the same forces that increase prices will induce new entrants to the mar-
ket. While used books by definition preclude this kind of market entry, one can take as an
example the massive proliferation in YouTubeTMchannels as a demonstration of this effect.
When consumers are free to search at low costs, one should expect increases of varieties in
highly taste-sensitive areas.
To demonstrate the relationship between search and prices and market entry/exit, I
will first build a simple and intuitive shopping space where firms and consumers interact.
This space will have the flavor of Burdett and Judd (1983) and more recently Kaplan and
Menzio (2016): where differential information for consumers motivates the pricing decisions
of firms. Unlike those papers, I will endogenize the search decisions of consumers and make
them flexible, such that consumers can choose the expected size of the basket of prices they
view. I will demonstrate that increased search generates two effects: a competition effect
and a match-quality effect. The former serves to depress prices while the latter pushes them
up; and the dominant effect (based on the shape of the distribution from which consumers
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Figure 3.2: Employees Per Firm
draw their taste) determines the overall response of price levels to cheaper search.
The tractability of the shopping space will then allow me to embed it into a general
equilibrium model that features entry and exit by firms. I will demonstrate the comparative
effects of online search within the context of this model, showing how the response of
markups, sales and firm entry/exit respond to increased search based on the tastes within
an industry. While right-tailed products will see a large proliferation of varieties in response
to cheaper search, more mean-centered products can see either declining or non-monotonic
responses.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 will present the shopping space
in which consumers and firms interact. It will present the theoretical results on pricing
responses to search. Section 3 will present general equilibrium results in light of the shopping
architecture and Section 4 concludes.
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3.2 The Model
3.2.1 The Shopping Space
Consumers and firms within the model interact according to an explicit microstructure
subject to search frictions. The environment should be considered as a single industry,
where the goods are largely substitutable up to an idiosyncratic, match-specific taste draw
that is drawn by the consumer for each variety produced by firms. Every firm produces
a distinct variety, meaning that every consumer has a vector of tastes representing their
unique valuations over the different goods.
In order to ascertain the location of these distinct varieties, consumers have access
to a search technology φ(; z), parameterized by a search efficiency parameter z. As stated
earlier, φ(; z) is a pmf over number of goods sampled from a population of firms, each selling
a unique variety. A well-known example of this kind of search technology is the Burdett
Judd (1985) environment, where 1 − φ(1; z) = z = φ(2; z). Another example that I will
favor throughout this section is a poisson distribution where z represents expected number
of draws
φ(k; z) =
e−zzk
k!
. z is a choice variable by the shopper, such that they can pay a cost to increase the number
of varieties they are likely to view.
Consumers’ tastes over the varieties offered by the firms are drawn from a taste
distribution described by the CDF G(), and they are hidden from the consumer until a
specific variety is observed. A consequence of learning valuations on observations is that
the level of a consumer’s taste shocks will not affect their incentives to search. Other than
the taste draws, products within an industry are homogeneous and so consumers will only
want to consume one good out of their industry basket.
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3.2.2 Sellers
Imagine a producer facing the problem of selling to consumers within an industry. The
producer takes as given the demand function of the consumer D(τ, p, µ) and the indirect
utility function V (τ, p, µ) over the taste, price, and shadow value of the numeraire for a
consumer. Define the function h(τ, p, p˜) to be the function such that, if a consumer views
two products in an industry with prices p, p˜, V (h(τ, p, p˜), p, µ) = V (τ, p, µ). That is,
h(τ, p, p˜) is the taste value that would make the consumer indifferent between the two
products.
I will detail the producer’s problem, working backward in time, to derive the objective
function. First, let the taste profile of a consumer have an arbitrary ranking {τ0, ..., τN−1}
over the N varieties in the industry where τ0 is the highest. The probablity that a shopper
who has viewed k prices would prefer the ith ranked object out of their basket (i.e. i was
their highest draw) is ((
N − i
N
)k
−
(
N − i− 1
N
)k−1)
. This is essentially Pr(j ≤ i)− Pr(j ≤ i− 1) from an ordered multinomial draw.
The probability of a variety being the ith ranked for a consumer, given that the taste
shock for that variety is τ , is then a binomial over the N − 1 other varieties given by
(
N − 1
i
)
G(τ)N−1−i(1−G(τ))i
Then, with the distribution over prices viewed given by φ(k; z), the probability of a
sale (and the expected number of sales) of a producer with price p and taste τ , given all
other firms charging p˜ is given by
∑∞
k=0 φ(k; z)
∑N−1
i=0
(
N−1
i
)
G(h(τ, p, p˜))N−1−i(1−G(h(τ, p, p˜)))i
((
N−i
N
)k − (N−i−1N )k−1)
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When φ(k; z) is a poisson pmf, the above reduces to
s˜(τ, p, p˜) ≡
(
1− e−z/N
) [
(1− e−z/N )G(h(τ, p, p˜)) + e−z/N
]N−1
It is worth taking a moment to unpack the above expression. The first term merely
represents the probability of being viewed by consumers, and so the effect of more search, in
the form of z increasing, is to improve the sales of the firm as more shoppers overall become
aware of them. The second term displays the competitive effects that a firm will face when
trying to sell over other firms. When z is low, that is the consumer is in expectation not
viewing very many prices, the sale probability (conditional on having been viewed) will be
heavily weighted toward one. This is the case where a firm is reasonably confident that any
shopper is not viewing or actively considering any other firms’ prices, and so the weighting
on the ranking of τ , given by G(h(τ, p, p˜)) does not enter strongly in the probability.
In the obverse, as z increases and the consumer is viewing more and more prices, the
competitive effects begin to be weighted much more strongly and the seller has to beat out
many other competitors, hence a strong weight on G(h(τ, p, p˜)). In the limit, as z → ∞,
the probability of sale approaches
s˜(τ, p, p˜) = G(h(τ, p, p˜))N−1
which is the perfect information, pure product differentiation model of Perloff and Salop
(1985).
Note in addition that the internal weighting of the above probability depends primarily
on the ratio zN , or the search-variety ratio. So, the transition from a noisy to a perfectly
informed world will require more search when there are more total varieties. Taking the
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number of varieties to a continuum in the limit, one finds
lim
N→∞
s˜(τ, p, p˜) = e−z(1−G(h(τ,p,p˜))
.
The function s˜ describes the probability of selling to a consumer of a given taste
variety τ , the next section will use this to determine the firm’s decision problem and derive
a symmetric pricing rule thereof.
3.2.3 The Firm’s Objective
This section will detail the firm’s program vis-a-vis their price setting behavior. It will
derive the equilibrium condition for a symmetric pricing rule, and will demonstrate the
two main theorems of the paper for the effect of search on prices. The crux of these two
theorems is that the shape of the taste distribution for consumers is what determines the
effect of search on prices.
A firm will engage in an N player game with the other variety sellers in order to
maximize its profits, given the state of the world. The firm owns a constant returns to scale
production function for its variable production, implying a marginal cost c. Also assume
that all consumers share a shadow value of a numeraire µ The firm’s problem is to maximize
its profits:
max
p
(p− c)
∫
supp(G)
D(τ, p, µ)s˜(τ, p, p˜)dG(τ) (FP)
where supp(G) represents the support of the taste distribution.
Taking first order conditions, and assuming a symmetric equilibrium, (and noting
that h(τ, p, p) = τ) yields the following (implicit) pricing strategy for a firm. (There is
a mild assumption here about differentiability of demand that has to be addressed when
demand is non differentiable.)
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p− c = −
∫
supp(G)D(τ, p, µ)s(τ)dG(τ)∫
supp(G)D2(τ, p, µ)s(τ)dG(τ) +
∫
supp(G)D(τ, p, µ)sp(τ)h2(τ, p, p)dG(τ)
where s(τ) ≡ s˜(τ, p, p) and sp(τ) = ∂∂p s˜(τ, p, p˜ = p)
There two relevant incentives for the expressed in the denominator above. The first
is standard, that is, how much marginal loss in demand a firms loses from a marginal
price change, given that a consumer decides to buy from that firm. The second represents
the marginal decrease in probability of making a sale from a marginal price change in
expectation.
Markups are then determined by the marginal effects of price changes on demand
conditional on sale and on probability of sale. The effect of increasing search, however, will
come about through the effects on s(τ), or the probability of sale. For the remainder of
this section I will detail two theorems for how prices will affect search under two specific
parameterizations of utility, linear and multiplicative in taste and quantity.
3.2.4 The Linear Case
Suppose that the utility of the consumer is linear when one unit is consumed, and for now
as well assume that the shadow value of a dollar is equal to one. That is,
V (x, τ, y) = τ{x = 1}+ y(M − p)
⇒ D(τ, p, 1) =

1 ⇐⇒ τ ≥ p
0 ⇐⇒ τ < p
. One can then rewrite the producer’s problem as:
max
p
(p− c)
∫ ∞
p
s˜(τ, p, p˜)dG(τ)
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Which will deliver the following condition (once symmetry is imposed) that pins down
the pricing rule in any equilibrium:
∫ ∞
p
s(τ)dG(τ) + (p− c)
[
−s(p)g(p) +
∫ ∞
p
sp(τ)dG(τ)
]
= 0
⇐⇒
∫ ∞
p
s(τ)dG(τ) + (p− c)
[
−
∫ ∞
p
g′(τ)s(τ)dτ
]
= 0
⇐⇒ p = c+
∫∞
p s(τ)dG(τ)∫∞
p g
′(τ)s(τ)dτ
where integration by parts was used on the term in brackets for the second line.
At this point it is useful to define the following function:
G˜(z) =
[
(1− e− zN )G(τ) + e− zN
]N
which generates the CDF
Gˆ(τ) =
G˜(τ)− e−z
1− e−z
Lemma 3.2.1. Gˆ(·; z) first-order stochastically dominates Gˆ(·; z′) if z > z′
Proof. e−
z
N is decreasing in z.
This lemma will be instrumental in proving the following proposition that shows the
precise response of prices to search:
Proposition 3.2.2. When utility is linear in quantity and taste, the consumer purchases
one unit, and tastes are ∼ Γ (d,λ) then the symmetric price equilibrium is increasing (de-
creasing) in z if and only if m is greater (less) than 1
Proof.
g′(τ) = −rg(τ)− 1−m
τ
g(τ)
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Figure 3.3: Gamma Densities and Price Schedules
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Response of Prices to Search
Rewriting the pricing rule:
p = c+
∫∞
p s(τ)dG(τ)
r
∫∞
p s(τ)dG(τ) + (1−m)
∫∞
p τ
−1s(τ)dG(τ)
= c+
1
r +
(1−m) ∫∞p τ−1s(τ)dG(τ)∫∞
p s(τ)dG(τ)
= c+
1
r + (1−m)EGˆ[τ−1|τ ≥ p]
Using lemma 3.2.1, we see that EGˆ[τ
−1|τ ≥ p] is decreasing in z, which shows p increasing
in z ⇐⇒ m > 1, as desired.
Figure 3.3 shows example gamma densities for different parameterizations, as well as
the response of prices to an increase in search by consumers. As proposition 3.2.2 states,
prices increase with search when m < 1 and decrease otherwise. The left figure shows
how m, the shape parameter of the gamma distribution, affects the overall shape. Low
values of m are very right-tailed, with the exponential distribution corresponding to m = 1
as the case with constant prices. Overall, the exponential distribution is still very right-
tailed relative to other parameterizations or other distributions—meaning that a heavily
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right-tailed taste distribution is required to actually observe increasing prices with search.
For example, the next corollary proposition shows that prices cannot increase in the linear
utility environment when tastes are modeled as a Gaussian distribution.
Proposition 3.2.3. When tastes are distribution N (0, σ2) in the linear utility case, prices
can only decrease with search
Proof.
g′(τ) = − τ
σ2
g(x)
⇒ p = c+ σ
2
EGˆ[τ |τ ≥ p]
This result is perhaps unsurprising given that the normal distribution is the limit of
a gamma distribution as the shape m− >∞.
3.2.4.1 Competition vs. Concentration
While the proof establishes the desired result, it does little to demonstrate the intuition at
play. For this, it is useful to return to the firm’s problem and recast it in a more general
form. Again consider a firm hoping to sell to a given consumer with valuation τ , rewrite
s˜(τ, p, p˜) as
s˜(τ, p, p˜) = pi(piG(τ − p+ p˜) + (1− pi))N−1
this is the generalized form found when the probability of viewing any given price is pi. In the
specific example above with a Poisson distribution over prices viewed, we have pi = 1−e− zN ,
or 1 minus the probability of not viewing the price with a rate of zN . This expression has
the following explanation from the perspective of a seller: the first pi is the probability of
one’s own variety being viewed, then, the probability under the exponent is the probability
of beating out any other variety. This is done with certainty if the other variety was not
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viewed at all—an event with a probability of pi—and with probability G(τ) in the event the
other price was viewed. The producer must beat out N − 1 such other varieties, and so this
probability is raised to that power.
At this point one can differentiate this probability with respect to p and set p˜ = p to
discern the marginal effect of price increases on a firm’s probability of sale in a symmetric
equilibrium:
sp(τ) = −pi(N − 1)(piG(τ) + (1− pi))N−2g(τ)
. Increasing the price of one’s good induces the possibility that any of the N − 1 other
varieties would supplant one’s own variety in preference, which is the case for the mass
given by those who beat out N − 2 other varieties times the mass g(τ) who are indifferent
between one’s own and another variety–this mass can be considered those consumers for
whom the firm is actively contending with another firm.
One can now rewrite the first order condition from the firm’s problem in the more
generalized setup as:
∫ ∞
p
s(τ)dG(τ) + (p− c)
[
−s(p)g(p)− pi(N − 1)
∫ ∞
p
(piG(τ) + (1− pi))N−2g(τ)dG(τ)
]
= 0
. The firm considers the negative effects on demand from increasing prices on each of the
possible valuations of its good, weighted by the distribution function G. I will now turn to
the effects of search on the function s˜ to demonstrate how probabilities of sale change when
search increases. Then I will demonstrate through the cross partial of prices and search
how a producer’s incentives over price changes themselves change as search increases.
In this environment, the probability pi is isomorphic to the number of prices viewed
by consumers, so we can observe the effect of increased search on s˜ by differentiating with
respect to pi:
spi(τ) = (piG(τ) + (1− pi))N−1 − (N − 1)(piG(τ) + (1− pi))N−2(1−G)pi
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. There are two effects of an increase in search on the probability of sale. The first term
is the increased probability that a consumer who prefers the firm in its basket will actually
find the firm. The second term represents the marginal probability that a consumer will
discover an erstwhile unknown variety that they prefer to the firm’s.
Now, differentiating again to find the cross partial of prices and search on the proba-
bility of sale delivers the following expression:
sppi = −(N − 1)(piG(τ) + (1− pi))N−2g(τ) + pi(N − 1)(N − 2)(piG(τ) + (1− pi))N−3(1−G(τ))g(τ)
= g(τ)(N − 1)(piG(τ) + (1− pi))N−3 [−(piG(τ) + (1− pi)) + (N − 2)(1−G(τ))pi]
. Here we at last see the two competing forces that govern the response of prices to increasing
search. On the one hand, increasing search marginally increases the incentive to raise prices
because a firm worries less about those consumers who are likely to have found a better
price, and so doesn’t have to include those consumers in its pricing plan. This effect is
stronger for those consumers who have a low valuation of the firm’s product, i.e. 1−G(τ)
is high.
On the other hand, increasing search incentivizes firms to lower prices because they are
now being considered by more consumers who feel they are in close contention with another
product. This means the effects of a change in price are larger because there’s a marginal
population of near-indifferent consumers. This effect is stronger for those consumers who
have a high valuation of the product.
The strength of these two forces over the support of possible valuations, weighted by
the density of valuations, determines the effect of increased search on prices. The weighting
over the types of consumers and therefore the dominant price-search effect is determined by
the shape of the taste distribution. A distribution with a fat right tail sees a larger positive
effect because they are able to quickly adapt their pricing strategy to focus more on their
higher valuation consumers who are less likely to be in contention. Said another way, they
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quickly have to worry less about the unenthused consumers for whom they are contending
because these consumers quickly find a better alternative: the amount of consumers in
contention decreases and they can increase prices.
In the obverse, when the distribution has a thinner right tail, the flight of unenthused
consumers is less numerous, and instead the dominant effect is an increase in the amount
of consumers who view one’s product as in contention with another–increasing effective
competition. Consumers added this way are price sensitive, and the effect is to decrease
the incentive to lower prices.
Take the two examples of used books and toothpaste. In the case of books, when
search is low, producers are worried mostly about selling to the large population of con-
sumers who don’t value the product highly at all, because this is a large portion of the
population and they rarely connect with the small measure that would value them highly.
However, as search increases, they are able to focus less on this population of ambivalent
consumers and instead focus on the price-insensitive, high-value consumers who really want
the book they’re selling. For toothpaste, valuations are very concentrated, meaning that
increased search serves to greatly increase the number of consumers that are in contention
for the firm, and the firm will see strong pressure to decrease prices and capture a larger
market share.
Proposition 3.2.2 is an interesting result that demonstrates the two key forces at play
and their relative strength. However, the specific environment of unit consumption and
linear utility relies on an assumption of an inflexible total amount demanded by the final
consumer and therefore understates any price effects of consumption volume. For example,
a consumer might decide to purchase more of a product at certain prices, given it is already
choosing its favorite from the basket. The next section will detail the case where utility is
multiplicative in taste and quantity and such a volume element will be at play.
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3.2.5 The Log Utility Case
Suppose for this section that a consumer has log utility over consumption of the good in
question. That is, they have preferences represented by the utility function
u(x, y) = ln(τx) + y
which leads to the value function
V (τ, p) = ln(τx) + (M − px)
After some algebra, the symmetric pricing rule will reduce to
p = c
[
1 +
∫
supp(G) s(τ)dG(τ)∫
supp(G) τs
′(τ)dG(τ)
]
. Here the firm exhibits multiplicative markups, and the markup is determined by the
sensitivity of a firm’s probability of sale to deviations in the price as seen in the denomina-
tor. Parameterizing the taste distribution function delivers the following result about the
reaction of prices to search in this environment.
Proposition 3.2.4. If G is Γ(m, r) and utility is log in taste and quantity u = ln(τx), then
prices can only decrease with search
Proof. Using integration by parts and the properties of the gamma pdf, one can find that
∫ ∞
0
τg(τ)s′(τ)dτ = −
∫ ∞
0
s(τ)g(τ)dτ −
∫ ∞
0
τs(τ)g′(τ)dτ
= r
∫ ∞
0
τs(τ)g(τ)dτ −m
∫ ∞
0
s(τ)g(τ)dτ
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One can then use this result in the pricing rules to find
p = c
[
1 +
∫
supp(G) s(τ)dG(τ)∫
supp(G) τs
′(τ)dG(τ)
]
= c
[
1 +
1
rEGˆ[τ ]−m
]
EGˆ[τ ] is increasing in z due to lemma 3.2.1
This result demonstrates that when utility is log, no matter how thick the right tail
of the taste distribution, prices can only decrease with search. The key parameter in this
environment for determining the effect of search on prices is now the rate parameter r. The
higher is r, the more quickly will prices decrease with search.
The reason for this result is that now the competitive effect is augmented by the fact
that the price affects the total demanded by an individual who has chosen to buy from a
given firm. This means that firms are more reticent to raise prices, and the variety-sampling
effect cannot dominate no matter the shape of the distribution.
Note that the lowest that EGˆ[τ ] can be is
m
r , which corresponds to the monopoly case
and delivers the well-known result that there is no profit-maximizing monopolistic price
with isoelastic utility.
3.2.6 The Consumer’s Problem
Similar to the firm’s problem, this section will detail the consumer’s problem, working
backward in time to develop the relevant conditions. It will show that the distribution that
consumers sample from when they search is precisely the pertinent distribution found in
the firm’s problem: G˜.
Suppose that once a consumer has chosen their desired good, they have a utility func-
tion U and budget constraint BC that deliver, through utility maximization, the indirect
utility function V (τ, p, µ) and demand function D(τ, p, µ) over taste, price and shadow value
of the numeraire.
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Imagine a consumer that has sampled a basket of goods from the N varieties, B of
size k with typical element (τ, p) ∈ B. Their problem at this point consists in choosing
max
bj∈B
V (τj , pj , µ)
Restricting to symmetric price equilibria as in the firm’s problem, this problem is
isomorphic to choosing the highest taste valuation from amongst the basket. Therefore, the
relevant distribution for the shopper is her highest sampled taste value.
Suppose that a consumer samples j of the N unique varieties with their search tech-
nology. Their expected utility, ex-ante taste shocks and given the price, is then given by
∫
supp(G)
V (τ, p, µ)d
[
G(τ)j
]
which is simply the valuation over the distribution of the maximum of j different draws.
Given that each of the N varieties are equally likely, the probability of drawing exactly
j unique varieties from a set of N when k total varieties have been drawn is given by
N !
(N − j)!NkS2(k, j)
where S2(k, j) =
1
j!
∑j
i=0(−1)j−i
(
j
i
)
)ik is the Stirling number of the second kind which
represents the number of ways to partition a set of size k into j non-empty subsets.
Combining all of the above together, the expected utility of a consumer who engages
in shopping in an industry is given by
∞∑
k=1
φ(k; z)
N∑
j=1
N !
Nk(N − j)!j!
j∑
i=0
(−1)j−i
(
j
i
)
ik
∫
supp(G)
V (τ, p, µ)d
[
G(τ)j
]
The following proposition then obtains when prices viewed are Poisson
Proposition 3.2.5. When the distribution over prices viewed is Poisson with rate z, then
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the expected value of search S(p, z) of a shopper is given by
S(p, z) =
∫
supp(G)
V (τ, p)d
[
(e−z/N + (1− e−z/N )G(τ))N
]
=
∫
supp(G)
V (τ, p)d
[
G˜(τ ; z)
]
where G˜ is the same as given in the firm’s section. Given the increasing stochastic
dominance property of G˜ from lemma 3.2.1, it is easy to see that ceteris paribus, search
utility is increasing in number of prices viewed.
Having in hand the value of shopping to the consumer, it is then easy to set up their
objective function wherein they choose how much to search:
V (p) = max
z
S(p, z)− ξ(z)
where ξ is the cost to the consumer of putting in the search effort to generate z. With the
sufficient condition that ξ(z) is convex in z, the following first order condition then pins
down the search strategy of a consumer in equilibrium which equates the marginal value of
search with its marginal cost:
Sz(p, z)− ξ′(z) = 0 (Sz)
. Given that the symmetric pricing strategy of firms is a function of z and N , we can then
use this condition to implicitly define the search rule of consumers for a given number of
establishments, z∗(N).
Figure 3.4 displays the search strategy of consumers for given parameterizations and
numbers of firms. The downward sloping lines are marginal benefits to search for different
parameterizations. The blue dashed lines correspond to a taste distribution with m = d = 5
that is, a unimodal thin-tailed distribution; while the solid black lines correspond to a
right tailed distribution with m = d = 0.5. Two things are evident from the figure. The
first is that a right-tailed distribution of tastes implies that the gains to search are higher,
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somewhat unsurprisingly. The second, is that the gains to search increase with the number of
establishments. This fundamental complementarity between search and number of varieties
is also somewhat unsurprising: if there aren’t many varieties, the gains to search will be low
because the consumer is not effectively sampling as many new products. The size of this
complementarity is larger for a right-tailed distribution, and the consumer increases their
search by more in response to proliferating varieties in this case.
3.3 General Equilibrium
The strategic behavior of the agents in the previous two sections can be combined with
a zero-profit condition for firms to define a general search equilibrium for prices, search
behavior and number of establishments. While prices respond by either monotonically
increasing or decreasing in response to cheaper search, this will not correspond exactly with
the number of establishments in equilibrium. It is possible for the number of establishments
to increase as the price decreases due to cheaper search because the impact on surplus of
increased demand outweighs that of the lowered price and so firms will enter the market to
capture the extra profits.
In order to derive the zero-profit condition, suppose that within a period firms must
pay a fixed cost φ in order to participate in the market. One can additionally show that
the demand for the products of any one firm is given by
1− G˜(p)
N
. This can come about through deriving it from the firm’s problem or simply noting that
firms will divide total demand 1−G˜(p) equally among themselves. The zero-profit condition
for firms operating in this market is then given by:
(p− c)1− G˜(p)
N
− φ = 0 (ZP)
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which simply equations the benefits of operating a firm within a period with the costs and
closes the model.
Equilibrium in this environment can then be defined as:
Definition 3.3.1. A symmetric search equilibrium is a triple of prices, search effort and
varieties (p, z,N) such that:
1. Given the behavior and number of other firms and the search effort of consumers, p
solves the firm’s pricing rule (FP)
2. Given the number of firms and their prices, z solves the consumer’s optimal search
problem (Sz)
3. Firms make zero profits according to (ZP)
. While the behavior of prices in response to rising search has been documented in
the firm section, the response of number of establishments—or the entry and exit of firms—
has not. There are two relevant forces present in the zero profit condition that dictate the
response of establishments to prices. The first is a demand effect, in that as consumers view
more products, they are more likely to find a product that is worth buying and so demand
1− G˜(p) will increase. When m < 1 there will be an additional upward pressure on demand
as prices fall, increasing the strength of the effect.
The second effect of increased search is the response of prices as seen in the firm
section. As search increases, prices will increase for right-tailed distributions (m < 1),
contributing to per sale profits of firms. In this case, both the demand and price effects
move in the same direction and one will see a large increase in varieties from cheaper search.
The right panel in Figure 3.5 portrays this case. As search cheapens, prices and demand
increase and firms enter the market.
The left panel of Figure 3.5 portray the case when the distribution is not right-tailed.
In this environment, the demand and price effects are moving in opposite directions for
100
Figure 3.5: Equilibria Under Falling and Rising Prices
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firms, and one can see a non-monotonic response of firm numbers to cheapened search as
first the demand effect dominates and then the competitive effects of prices take over.
3.4 Conclusion
This paper motivated and explored the impact of falling search costs on both the prices of
goods and the entry/exit decisions of firms. It showed that prices can respond to increased
consumer search by either rising or falling. The key determinant of the price response
lies in the distribution of tastes from which consumers draw: when tastes are right-tailed,
search serves to concentrate a firm’s buyers among a smaller set of consumers with higher
valuations and therefore firms increase prices; while less-dispersed distributions serve to put
downward pressure on prices as increased search serves to put a firm into more effective
competition with its peers.
The differential responses to prices was shown to feed through into a differential effect
on market entry and exit. When consumers sample more products, right-tailed distribu-
tions will feature a monotonically increasing number of establishments as variety incentives
dominate the market. Alternatively, firm numbers can respond non-monotonically when the
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distribution is not right-tailed, with demand and price effects working against each other
to determine the overall outcome.
There are several intriguing extensions to the paper that are not addressed here. The
first is equilibria with different price levels, especially in their outcomes over the business
cycle. Kaplan and Menzio (2016) demonstrate the strong feedback effects possible when
consumers increase their shopping behavior, and so the possible multiplicity of shopping
equilibria with different search costs would be an interesting subject of future study. In
addition, the framework described in this paper might shed insight into the cyclicality of
markups when firms are heterogeneously efficient and how this is affected by the taste
distribution of goods. Lastly, the non-monotonic response of firm numbers to increased
search presents an intriguing rationalization for the commonly observed phenomenon of
industry shakeouts. Exploring industry shakeouts in a model similar to that in this paper–
where consumers gradually become aware of a product–would be an interesting exercise.
The internet is drastically changing the way that consumers shop for their goods.
However, as demonstrated in a limited way in this paper, we should not expect the response
to be the same in all cases; instead, it will depend on the fundamentals of the market itself
how markets react to the cheapness of search.
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